Austro-Hungarian raid on Durrës

On 29 December 1915 the Austro-Hungarian light cruiser SMS Helgoland and five Tátra-class destroyers again raided the Albanian port of Durrës. The previous raid, on 6 December, had cost the Entente only a few sailing vessels. This time the Italians, who had occupied the town a few days earlier, already had batteries on the hills and a minefield off the port. The Austrians sank a steamer and two sailing vessels in the roadstead, and during the night on their way the French submarine Monge, but two of their destroyers, Lika and Triglav, ran onto mines. Lika sank at once. The damaged Triglav had to be abandoned after several hours under tow. The rest of the force was chased until dusk by British and Italian cruisers from Brindisi.

A slow alarm

The British official history describes in detail how Brindisi reacted to the news of the raid. The first report was inaccurate. An Italian officer who came aboard the British cruiser HMS Dartmouth in the morning spoke of Austrian destroyers off Vlorë. Only just before putting to sea did Dartmouth’s commander, Captain Addison, learn that Durrës was meant. He did not wait for the French destroyers, which did not yet have steam up, but sailed with the Italian cruiser Quarto and decided to place himself between the Austrians and their base at Kotor.

The second force sailed later. The Italian vice-admiral commanding at Brindisi, Emanuele Cutinelli Rendina, preferred to wait for more reliable news. Captain D. B. Crampton of the cruiser HMS Weymouth went across to his flagship and asked for permission to sail. Only after 9 a.m., when a report came in that the Austrians were still off Durrës, did the admiral send Rear-Admiral Belleni to sea with the cruiser Nino Bixio, Weymouth and four destroyers. The British believed afterwards that had Belleni turned at once towards the coast, as Addison had, the action would have begun at least two hours earlier.

Seitz and Csepel

Helgoland’s commander, Captain Heinrich Seitz, knew from the morning that he would be pursued. At 8.15 a.m. his wireless operators intercepted a report from Durrës to Brindisi. The destroyer Tátra, towing Triglav, could make 6 knots, and Csepel had a length of towing hawser in her propeller. At 12.10 p.m. Seitz issued an order in case of an encounter with cruisers: Triglav was to be scuttled, her documents, money and crew transferred to Balaton, and Helgoland would draw the enemy’s fire to give Csepel a chance to escape. At 12.50 p.m. he met the Austro-Hungarian submarine U-15 and ordered her to lie in wait by the abandoned Triglav, in the hope that the Allied cruisers would stop beside it and become an easy target.

The trap failed, but Seitz kept his word. When at about 1.40 p.m. Dartmouth opened fire, Helgoland manoeuvred for several hours so as to shield the slower destroyer. When at about 2.10 p.m. Quarto turned towards Dartmouth, Seitz wrote in his log that his torpedo had forced the Italians to take evasive action. No one on board Quarto noticed that torpedo. The British official history cites the episode as an example of how badly opponents can misjudge each other’s intentions. After 3.30 p.m. Belleni’s force joined the chase, and for a time four Allied cruisers were firing at Helgoland. She was hit several times but lost no speed. After sunset she passed just ahead of the Italian ships and at about 6 p.m. vanished into the darkness.

The toll

Seitz brought Helgoland and three destroyers back to Kotor. He had lost two of the six most modern destroyers of the Austro-Hungarian fleet, and in return had sunk the submarine Monge and three small vessels. Monge’s captain, Roland Morillot, went down with his boat. The British stressed Seitz’s courage, but realised that with better cooperation between the Brindisi forces Helgoland would not have returned to base. Most important, however, was the effect on shipping. The Austro-Hungarian cruisers suspended their sorties for several weeks, and the evacuation of the Serbian army through Durrës and other Albanian ports went on.