Nixon takes over command in Mesopotamia

On 9 April 1915 General Sir John Nixon arrived in Basra and took over command of the British and Indian troops in Mesopotamia. The Government of India had appointed him to the post on 18 March. The previous commander of Indian Expeditionary Force “D”, Lieutenant-General Arthur Barrett, had been ill for some time. He formally retained command of the 6th (Poona) Division, but three days later left for India, and his division was taken over temporarily by the senior brigade commander, General Charles Fry. At the end of April General Charles Townshend took it over permanently.

With Nixon came the staff of an army corps, which took over the work hitherto done by the staff of the 6th Division. The forces on the Persian Gulf were henceforth to form II Indian Corps: the 6th (Poona) Division, the new 12th Indian Division under General George Gorringe and the 6th Cavalry Brigade. New brigades were, however, still arriving from India and Egypt. General Charles Melliss’s 30th Brigade disembarked at Basra on 6 April, and the last battalion of the 33rd Brigade on the day of Nixon’s arrival. According to the British official history the new organisation had not yet been fully put into effect.

Orders and the voyage

The instructions Nixon received at Army Headquarters in India provided for the occupation of the whole vilayet of Basra and the preparation of a plan for a march on Baghdad. On 30 March he received additional instructions: he was to assess whether a light railway, armoured cars, aircraft and more river steamers were needed on the Tigris and Euphrates. A day later the General Staff in India telegraphed him that the Turkish forces were divided into two widely separated wings and that, thanks to the river flotilla, they could be beaten one after the other. Later, before the commission investigating the conduct of the campaign, Nixon testified that he had understood these orders as heralding a move to the offensive.

On the way, on 5 April, he stopped at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf. German agents were active in southern Persia at the time, stirring up the local tribes against the British. The Government of India reminded Nixon that at Bushehr he was to do nothing beyond what was necessary to protect the lives and property of British subjects.

On the threshold of battle

The new commander reached Basra just when a Turkish attack was expected. Since the beginning of April reports had said that the troops of Lieutenant-Colonel Süleyman Askerî had concentrated on the Euphrates in the Nukhaila area. The British estimated them at 12,000 regulars with 24–30 guns and 8,000–10,000 Arab tribal warriors. These figures, as it later turned out, were exaggerated. The main objective was the British camp at Shaiba, some fifteen kilometres south-west of Basra, where Fry stood with two infantry brigades and a cavalry brigade. The spring floods had turned the ground between Basra and Shaiba into a vast shallow lake. Supplies reached the camp only by boat or on pack mules wading belly-deep in water.

Nixon judged the position of Shaiba, cut off from Basra by water, to be dangerous. He agreed with Barrett, however, that reinforcements should be sent there at the last moment, because bringing up supplies for a larger number of men was very difficult. On 11 April Fry reported that the Turkish advance guard was approaching the camp. Nixon decided to send the 30th Brigade and a mountain artillery battery to Shaiba the next day. Command in the camp was to pass to Melliss, who was senior to Fry. Nixon himself intended to inspect Shaiba in person in the morning. The Turks, however, forestalled him and attacked at dawn on 12 April.