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Britain and France conclude the Entente Cordiale

Category:
Diplomacy
Date:
8 April 1904
Author:
Natalia
Tags:
Great Britain, France, Egypt, Morocco

On 8 April 1904 in London the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, and the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon, signed three documents which closed most of the colonial disputes between the two age-old rivals. The settlement was called the Entente Cordiale, the “cordial understanding”, although it was not an alliance: it contained no military obligations and no promise of help in the event of war. Even so, from that day Britain and France ceased to be adversaries and gradually began to become partners.

From Fashoda to London

Only six years earlier the two countries had nearly come to blows on the upper Nile. After the Fashoda incident in 1898 France had to back down. The new Foreign Minister, Théophile Delcassé, concluded, however, that for France, already bound by its alliance with Russia, friendship with London paid better than a struggle over Egypt, and he turned its ambitions towards Morocco.

The British were also looking for a way out of isolation. The Boer War had shown how hard it was to defend the empire alone, and talks with Germany in 1898–1901 produced no agreement. In January 1902 London concluded an alliance with Japan. In early 1904 a Russo-Japanese war threatened, which might drag in the allies of both sides, France and Britain. The German historian Günther Kronenbitter notes that it was precisely then that the British were ready to draw closer to France, their long-standing rival in overseas expansion.

The ground was prepared by King Edward VII. On 1 May 1903 he arrived in Paris on an official visit, where the crowds greeted him coldly and some shouted cheers for the Boers. Within three days he had won the Parisians over, and in July President Émile Loubet (PL) paid a return visit to London. The French later regarded the King as the father of the agreement, but historians give the credit chiefly to the diplomats: its terms were worked out by Delcassé, Lansdowne and Cambon.

Egypt for Morocco

The most important document was the declaration on Egypt and Morocco. The British government declared that it had no intention of altering the political status of Egypt, and France undertook not to obstruct British action in that country. In return Britain recognised that it belonged to France, “as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco”, to preserve order there and to assist administrative, economic, financial and military reforms. The two states guaranteed for 30 years equal treatment of their trade in both countries, and fortifications were forbidden on the coast of Morocco opposite Gibraltar. France was to come to an understanding with Spain, which had possessions of its own on the Moroccan coast. The last article read: “The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support”, in order to carry out the clauses on Egypt and Morocco.

Five secret articles were attached to the declaration. They provided that even if either side were compelled to change its policy towards Egypt or Morocco, the key engagements would remain in force, and that part of Morocco near Melilla and Ceuta would fall into Spain’s sphere of influence whenever the Sultan ceased to rule it. They were published only in 1911.

The second document, a convention, concerned Newfoundland (PL) and West Africa. France gave up its rights on the western coast of the island, granted to it as long ago as 1713, keeping the right to fish, and in return received territorial compensation in Africa: the Los Islands off the coast of Guinea, Yarbutenda on the Gambia and a more favourable frontier east of the Niger. The third declaration divided influence in Siam and dealt with Madagascar and the New Hebrides (PL).

A turn in Europe

At first sight these were agreements about fishing and colonial boundaries, and the French website Herodote stresses that they said nothing about help in the event of aggression. But in Berlin, where policy had long counted on hostility between London and Paris, the settlement was seen as a threat. Kronenbitter writes that what looked like a modest deal about far-flung places marked the beginning of a major realignment of the powers. At the turn of the century the best British battleships had been stationed at Gibraltar and Malta in case of war with France. In time the Admiralty could watch the German fleet ever more closely. When a year later Germany tried to undermine the settlement in Morocco, it only strengthened it.

Sources

  1. avalon.law.yale.edu · entecord
  2. encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net · alliance system 1914
  3. encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net · arms race prior to 1914 armament policy
  4. herodote.net · 8 avril 1904 evenement 19040408
  5. aspectsofhistory.com · over and underestimating the entente cordiale
  6. Entente Cordiale · Wikipedia (en)

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