Chinese-Japanese agreement on Manchuria

The British chronology of the war records under 23 March 1915 that the governments of China and Japan concluded a secret agreement on future policy in Manchuria. In reality no final agreement was signed that day. At another conference in Peking, as part of the negotiations under way since February over the so-called Twenty-One Demands, the two sides initialled several articles concerning South Manchuria. It was an important but only partial accord, and the negotiations went on for more than another month and a half.

The Twenty-One Demands

Japan used the war in Europe to strengthen its position in China. In November 1914 it captured German Tsingtao, and on 18 January 1915 its minister in Peking, Hioki Eki, handed the President of China, Yuan Shikai, a list of 21 demands divided into five groups. Japan wanted to take over the German rights in Shantung, to strengthen its influence in South Manchuria and the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, to obtain a share in the great Hanyeping mining and metallurgical concern, and a pledge that China would not cede any of its coast to any other power. The fifth group went furthest: it provided, among other things, for Japanese political, financial and military advisers in the Chinese government and for a joint police force in important cities. Meeting it would have made China in practice a Japanese protectorate.

The Japanese demanded secrecy. When in February they disclosed the content of their demands to the powers, they left out the fifth group, and later presented it as “wishes” rather than demands.

Negotiations under pressure

The negotiations began on 2 February 1915 in Peking. China was represented by the Foreign Minister, Lu Zhengxiang, and Japan by its minister, Hioki. The Chinese played for time, counting on help from the Western powers, but Britain, Japan’s ally, engaged in the war in Europe, did not want to cross it. On 6 March Hioki declared that his government was dissatisfied with the slow pace of the talks and that if China did not make important concessions by 12 March, Japan might resort to “measures outside diplomacy”.

The Chinese gave way on Manchurian matters in order to save what they regarded as most important, namely the rejection of the fifth group. By mid-March they had agreed to extend to 99 years the Japanese rights to the South Manchuria Railway and the line from Antung to Mukden, which would otherwise have expired in the 1920s and 1930s. The Japanese lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, taken over after the war with Russia, was ultimately to last just as long. On 13 March the American Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, handed the Japanese ambassador a note in which he recognised that Japan had special interests in Manchuria but expressed concern at demands that infringed China’s independence.

The conference of 23 March

According to a dispatch from the American minister in Peking, Paul Reinsch, at the conference of 23 March articles were initialled on Japan’s priority in railway construction, on loans secured on local revenues and on advisers in South Manchuria. China was to turn first to Japan if it needed foreign capital for railways or advisers in the region, and not to pledge provincial revenues without its consent. A change in the contract for the railway from Changchun to the city of Kirin in Japan’s favour was also agreed. A Chinese proposal that the Japanese might settle in the interior of Manchuria on condition that they registered, paid taxes and submitted to the Chinese police was forwarded to Tokyo by Minister Hioki. The questions of Mongolia were postponed. On 25 March the handing over of nine mining areas in Manchuria to the Japanese was also agreed.

The talks were held in the shadow of troops. Japan announced that it was sending units to China to relieve the garrisons stationed there, but for the time being it did not withdraw the old ones. On 22 March the Chinese government learned of the arrival of 1,200 Japanese soldiers along the railway in Shantung and 6,000 in Manchuria, and American consuls reported an almost twofold increase in Japanese forces in the South Manchuria Railway zone.

The ultimatum

The March agreements did not settle the matter. The Japanese would not give up the fifth group, and on 26 April they presented a revised list of demands, which China rejected. On 7 May Japan issued an ultimatum from which, under pressure from the elder statesmen, most of the fifth group had been removed. On 9 May Yuan Shikai accepted it, and in China that day came to be called National Humiliation Day. On 25 May 1915 the Sino-Japanese agreements were signed, among them the treaty on South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, which included the provisions negotiated in March.