Clash at Wadi Senab

On 13 December 1915 the first expedition of the British Western Frontier Force against the Senussi order ended near Mersa Matruh. The British official history of the operations in Egypt calls it the “affair of the Wadi Senab” and uses that name for three days, from 11 to 13 December, with two engagements. The first, in the Wadi Senab proper, took place on 11 December, the second and larger on 13 December at the Wadi Hasheifiat, a dozen or so kilometres further west. The date of 13 December in the chronology of the war thus corresponds to the last day of the expedition.

The first blow

The commander of the Western Frontier Force, Major-General Alexander Wallace, had had at Mersa Matruh since 10 December all the units concentrated there after the evacuation of Sollum. Groups of the order’s followers, numbering from a hundred to five hundred men, perhaps 2,500 in all, were gathering around the town. Wallace decided to strike as soon as possible, even with small forces: the aim was to undermine the prestige of Sayyid Ahmad among the Bedouin and to force his men to fight before reinforcements arrived from the Italian front in Cyrenaica.

On the morning of 11 December a column under Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. R. Gordon, commanding the 15th Sikhs, left Matruh to disperse a Senussi force at Duwwar Hussein, about 25 kilometres west of the town. The infantry marched along the telegraph line by the coast, while a composite yeomanry regiment, artillery and the armoured cars of a Royal Naval Air Service squadron moved along the Khedivial Motor Road. After about fourteen kilometres the mounted troops came under fire at close range from the Wadi Senab. An attempt to outflank the enemy with the help of the armoured cars broke down under heavy fire, but in the afternoon, when the guns came into action and a squadron of the Australian Light Horse arrived from Matruh, the enemy was driven out. According to the official history, the Senussi force numbered about three hundred men and lost about 80 killed and 7 prisoners. The British had 16 killed and 17 wounded. Among the dead was Lieutenant-Colonel C. L. Snow, the former commandant of Sollum, who was now serving on the staff as an intelligence officer. He was killed when he approached a cave to persuade a wounded Bedouin to surrender, convinced that no Arab would shoot at a man so well known in the desert.

Ambush at the Wadi Hasheifiat

Gordon, informed of the fighting by a message dropped from an aircraft, did not turn back, because about ten kilometres separated him from the mounted troops and his small column was carrying a heavy train. He spent the night at the wells of Umm er Rakham, where the mounted troops joined him in the evening. On 12 December the tired yeomanry horses needed rest, and the only activity was rounding up cattle, camels and 25 prisoners from the surrounding area. During the night the 6th Battalion, Royal Scots, less two companies, arrived from Matruh escorting a supply convoy. Airmen reported considerable enemy forces at Duwwar Hussein, so Gordon decided to march west along the telegraph to the Wadi Hasheifiat and then up the wadi towards Duwwar Hussein, so as not to expose his flank.

At about 9.15 a.m. on 13 December, when the column had covered barely three kilometres, heavy firing broke out on the left flank. The Royal Scots flank guard fell back in haste, pursued by men so like British soldiers that Gordon for a moment thought two parties of Scots were firing at each other. They were the muhafiziya, the regular soldiers of the order, who advanced in open order, making use of cover, and, as the British official history admitted, did credit to the training of Ja’far al-Askari. Gordon estimated them at 1,000 to 1,500 men. They had one or two guns, which shot very badly, and three well-handled machine guns. The advanced guard with the Sikhs was pinned down in the fighting and could not withdraw without abandoning its wounded, and the Royal Scots were unable to get onto the ridge. Gordon called for reinforcements from the camp by heliograph. Seventy-five armed men of the Australian Army Service Corps arrived, and from Matruh two squadrons of Australian mounted troops with two guns. At about 3.15 p.m. a lucky shell from these guns hit the largest group of attackers, which scattered. The whole enemy front then fell back.

Outcome

It was too late for a pursuit, so Gordon withdrew the column to camp, and on 14 December it returned to Matruh, utterly exhausted. His losses amounted to 9 killed and 56 wounded. The British estimated the enemy’s losses at about 250 men, and the history of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade even speaks of 180 dead left on the field. Ja’far al-Askari claimed after the war that his regular troops had lost only 17 killed and 30 wounded, not counting their Bedouin allies. The British historian admitted that the Senussi forces had surprised the column and fought with vigour, and that if the whole column had been as well trained as the 15th Sikhs, they might have suffered a heavy defeat. The enemy withdrew undefeated and soon began to gather closer to Matruh. From 15 December until Christmas Eve bad weather halted further operations.