Romania refuses to help Serbia

The British chronology of the war records under 15 October 1915 that the government of Romania refused to help Serbia. It was the second day of open war between Bulgaria and Serbia. Since 6 October Serbia had been defending itself in the north against the German and Austro-Hungarian armies, and on 14 October Bulgaria declared war on it. We have not been able to find the text of the Romanian reply of that day. Contemporary accounts and later studies, however, allow Bucharest’s position in mid-October to be reconstructed precisely: Romania would remain neutral and would not move until the Entente sent a large army to the Balkans.

A second refusal

This was not the Serbs’ first such disappointment. As early as January 1915 the prime minister, Ion I. C. Brătianu, had rejected the Entente’s suggestion that Romania help Serbia together with Greece. The main reason then had been Bulgaria’s uncertain attitude. Now Bulgaria had already sided with the Central Powers, and Romania found itself in an even worse position. To the north, in Transylvania and Bukovina, it faced Austro-Hungarian and German armies; to the south, beyond the Danube, Bulgarian ones. Russia, the only ally that could come to its aid by land, had just completed the great retreat from Poland and Lithuania. The Entente was also losing at the Dardanelles, and only through the Straits could Romania count on supplies of arms and ammunition from the West.

According to the British “The Times History of the War”, both sides were sounding out Brătianu in Bucharest. The Entente hoped that the mere threat of Romanian intervention would restrain Bulgaria and save Serbia. The Central Powers wanted to secure the left flank of their offensive. Brătianu replied to the Entente powers that intervention was out of the question unless they sent at least 400,000 soldiers to Salonika. It was a demand impossible to meet. The first divisions from Gallipoli were just arriving at Salonika, and the whole Entente force promised to Greece numbered 150,000 men. The prime minister therefore assured Berlin and Vienna that Romania would remain neutral. According to the German press, Bulgaria had received a similar assurance as early as 20 September.

Dispute in Bucharest

The prime minister’s decision disappointed the supporters of the Entente. The Conservative Nicolae Filipescu and Take Ionescu had argued since the beginning of the war that Romania must fight for Transylvania. At one of the great rallies in Bucharest Filipescu argued that Germany could throw at most 300,000 men against Serbia, and that their attack could be repelled if Romania intervened and the Entente sent 150,000 soldiers. The crowd called on the government to mobilise all its forces. In the following weeks the pro-Entente press wrote of “desertion” of Serbia and demanded that at least Russian troops be allowed through Romania to strike at the Bulgarians. Brătianu, however, had no intention of taking the risk. As John Buchan observed in “Nelson’s History of the War”, then being published, Romania could move only when an Allied army capable of tying down the main Bulgarian forces stood on the Aegean, and Russia had gathered enough troops in Bessarabia to shield it from a blow from the Carpathians. Neither condition was met at the time.

Romania also had its own reasons for waiting. The secret agreement with Russia of the autumn of 1914 promised it Transylvania in return for benevolent neutrality, without any obligation to enter the war immediately. Brătianu wanted to choose the moment of entry himself and had no intention of sacrificing the army to save Serbia. At the same time he held a card that mattered to the Germans: he did not allow munitions transports to Turkey through Romania and kept control over grain exports, which the Central Powers lacked because of the British blockade and poor harvests.

What came next

Romania’s neutrality meant that Serbia was left alone between three armies. By the end of October the Bulgarians had joined up with the Austrians and Germans on the Danube, opening a supply route to Turkey that bypassed Romania. At the end of October Brătianu, wishing to ease tension with the Central Powers, announced the resumption of grain exports through a special commission, and in the following weeks Germany and Austria-Hungary bought huge quantities of grain in Romania. Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente only in August 1916, when the Russian Brusilov offensive seemed to give it a chance that was out of the question in October 1915.