South Africans take Otavifontein

On 1 July 1915 the forces of the Union of South Africa took the Otavifontein springs and the railway junction of Otavi in the north of German South West Africa. This was the objective of the offensive that General Louis Botha had begun at the end of June. It was decided by a single day of fighting, waged in dense bush by General Manie Botha’s mounted brigade.

A night march without water

Between Okaputa and Otavifontein stretched about 45 miles (more than 70 km) of waterless bush. Beyond this obstacle the Germans had occupied the Elefantenberg (Elephants Ridge), rising above the plain. According to the South African official history they had mined the approaches and the flanks of the position, and they had their camp and depots at the Otavifontein springs. At 6 p.m. on the evening of 30 June Manie Botha’s 5th Mounted Brigade set out from Okaputa, and half an hour later General Henry Lukin’s 6th Mounted Brigade left Omarassa. The next day the two brigades were to attack the ridge together. Had the attack stalled, men and horses would have had to turn back dozens of miles to Okaputa for water.

At about 5 a.m. on 1 July, still in darkness, the head of the 5th Brigade ran into German outposts and broke them up so quickly that they had no time to fire the agreed warning rockets. Instead of going on as ordered, Manie Botha set off after the fleeing Germans with his whole brigade in the hope of surprising the main force. At about 6.30 a.m. he struck the western flank of the ridge. The Germans, who for lack of water held it with only a weak garrison and were counting on a warning, did not have time to bring up reinforcements.

Fighting in the bush

By 7 a.m. the western flank of the position had been turned, and the Germans withdrew from the rest of the ridge. A few miles further on the brigade clashed with units coming up from Otavi. According to the official history this was the heaviest fighting of the day, conducted on flat ground in dense thickets. At about noon the Germans fell back to the western slope of the Otavi mountains, and then further north, towards the hills at Khorab. Meanwhile Lukin’s brigade crossed the Eisenberg pass, which the Germans had turned into a large minefield. South African soldiers found and cut the cable leading to the detonators, and took the German crew of the firing point prisoner before it realised that its apparatus was not working.

At about 9.30 a.m. Louis Botha himself arrived on the battlefield with his chief of staff, General Collyer. Manie Botha had to explain to him why he had changed the direction of the march on his own authority and thrown his whole brigade into the fight without leaving a reserve. The commander-in-chief accepted the explanation, because the result spoke for itself.

The day’s reckoning

According to the official history Manie Botha had 1,958 men and four guns. The same history estimates the German forces in the Otavi area at 3,372 men with 36 guns and 22 machine guns, but only a small part of them went into action. On the spot the commander was Major Hermann Ritter, whose detachment was to delay the South African advance. Losses were small: on the Union side 4 killed and, according to various accounts, from 7 to 12 wounded; on the German side a few killed, a few wounded and 20–25 prisoners. A few days later the German chief of staff admitted that if the defenders had had even an hour to man their prepared positions, Botha would have had to withdraw.

The Otavifontein springs gave Botha’s army water, and the capture of the junction at Otavi cut the Germans’ main road. Lieutenant-Colonel Victor Franke concentrated his troops on the hills at Khorab, a dozen or so miles to the north. At the same time the brigades of Generals Myburgh and Brits were closing in from the east and west to cut off his retreat to the last depots at Tsumeb and Namutoni. A few days later the Germans asked for an armistice.