Manchu restoration in China

At four in the morning on 1 July 1917, in the Forbidden City in Peking, a handful of Manchu princes, courtiers and former imperial officials attended the return to the throne of the eleven-year-old Puyi, the last emperor of the Qing dynasty, who had abdicated in February 1912. Behind the coup stood General Zhang Xun, known as the “pigtailed general”, because he and his soldiers had not cut off their queues as a sign of loyalty to the dynasty. During the night his troops occupied the railway station, the post office and the telegraph office, and in the morning the police went round shops and houses with orders to hang out the imperial dragon flag. The inhabitants of the capital woke up in an empire. At noon the American minister, Paul Reinsch, informed the State Department that at two in the morning the chief of the general staff and the commander of the gendarmerie had, in the name of the monarchists, called on President Li Yuanhong to step down in favour of the emperor.

From the dispute over the war to the coup

The restoration grew out of the crisis unleashed by the dispute over China’s entry into the war. When in March China broke off relations with Germany, Prime Minister Duan Qirui pressed for a declaration of war, while parliament and the president held back. On 23 May Li Yuanhong dismissed Duan. The generals loyal to him, the military governors of the northern provinces, declared their “independence” of the government in Peking and demanded the dissolution of parliament. At the beginning of June the president called in as mediator Zhang Xun, the military governor of Anhui, whose troops were stationed at Xuzhou on the Tientsin–Nanking railway. Zhang set a condition: the dissolution of parliament. On 13 June Li, under pressure from the generals, signed a decree which was countersigned by the commander of the gendarmerie, because the acting prime minister had refused. On 14 June Zhang entered Peking, and the governors withdrew their declarations of independence. The crisis seemed to be dying down.

Zhang Xun, a former imperial general who in 1911 had defended Nanking against the revolutionaries, had, however, an aim of his own. During the night of 30 June – 1 July, together with a group of monarchists, among them the reformer Kang Youwei, he carried out the coup. Reinsch wrote on 3 July that it was in essence Zhang’s personal act, prepared in so narrow a circle that it could be carried out with lightning speed, but for that very reason doomed to universal opposition. According to later accounts by some of the participants, the generals of the north, including Duan’s men, had earlier encouraged Zhang to march on Peking, reckoning that he would overthrow Li Yuanhong and then be removed himself. This testimony, however, was written down years later and remains disputed.

The emperor’s edicts

In the afternoon the first edict was issued in the emperor’s name. Puyi was “resuming rule” at the request of generals named one by one, among them Vice-President Feng Guozhang, and even of Li Yuanhong himself, who was said to have begged for the restoration of the empire and for his own punishment for “usurping” power. As a reward Li was given the title of a prince of the first rank. These petitions were forged, as the American minister noticed at once. The new authorities’ nine-point programme announced a constitutional monarchy, a ban on princes of the blood meddling in politics, the abolition of the stamp tax, an amnesty for political offenders and freedom to wear the queue. It also gave assurances that all foreign agreements and loans would remain in force, because without recognition by the foreign powers the restoration had no chance. Zhang Xun became head of the government and viceroy of the metropolitan province of Zhili, and Kang Youwei vice-president of the privy council.

Li Yuanhong refused. He told Zhang’s envoys that he would not recognise the empire, and on 1 July itself sent out telegrams calling for the defence of the republic and denying that he had asked for the restoration of the empire. Reinsch noted that the president was ready to step down, but only in favour of the vice-president, and asked the United States not to recognise the restoration. On the evening of 2 July Li slipped away by car from the presidential palace in Zhongnanhai and took refuge in the Legation Quarter with the Japanese military attaché. The Japanese agreed to protect him on condition that he engaged in no political activity. Before that he had managed to reinstate Duan as prime minister, send the seal of state to Tientsin and ask Feng Guozhang in Nanking to take over the duties of president.

The country against the emperor

The restoration found no support. As early as 1 July the consul general in Shanghai reported that southern politicians and fleet commanders were announcing armed resistance, and Sun Yat-sen condemned the coup. On 2 July Reinsch cabled that Zhang’s coup was not supported even by the generals of the north, whose names had been used without their consent, and that Duan Qirui was against it. The diplomatic corps, so as not to give any appearance of recognising the new authorities, decided to communicate with them only by informal memoranda, and through its doyen, the Dutch minister, warned them that they were responsible for the president’s safety. On 3 July Feng Guozhang publicly came out against the monarchy, and Duan took command of the troops assembled near Tientsin and issued a manifesto in which he called Zhang a traitor and a forger. Republican troops set off for Peking. In the Entente countries it was suspected that German money lay behind the coup, because Zhang Xun had publicly opposed the break with Germany as early as March, and that same month the German minister Paul von Hintze, on his way out of China, had visited him at Xuzhou. This, however, was never proved. All that was certain was that the restoration, while it lasted, put off China’s decision on the war.