Russians bombard the Bosporus again

On 25 April 1915, as British and French troops were landing on the Gallipoli peninsula, the Russian Black Sea Fleet appeared at the entrance to the Bosporus and shelled the forts guarding it. It was the second Russian bombardment of the strait after the expedition at the end of March. This time the Russians acted at the express request of their allies, and the demonstration was meant to draw the Turks’ attention away from the Dardanelles.

De Robeck’s request

When the commander of the Allied fleet at the Dardanelles, Vice-Admiral John de Robeck, learned of the March bombardment of the Bosporus, he proposed to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Andrei Eberhardt, that the next strike be timed to coincide with the Allied attack on the Dardanelles. It was initially assumed that the Russians would land troops on the Bosporus once the Allies had forced the straits. The V Caucasian Corps was assembled in Odessa for this purpose, and several times soldiers were loaded onto ships for show. The Turkish raid on Odessa on 3 April, however, showed that the Goeben could still steam at 26 knots, of which Eberhardt warned de Robeck on 11 April. Carrying a corps across a sea on which a fast German battlecruiser was operating seemed too risky.

According to the British official history of naval operations, de Robeck agreed that the Russians should not embark troops for the time being, but asked for a demonstration by the fleet off the Bosporus on the day of the Gallipoli landings. According to Russian accounts, the Allies addressed this request to the Russian headquarters on 18 April, and on 23 April Eberhardt reported that the fleet would sail for the Bosporus the next day.

The bombardment on the day of the landings

Little is known about the bombardment itself. Russian accounts describe the expeditions of 28 March and of 2 and 3 May in detail, but hardly discuss the one of 25 April. The British historian Julian Corbett states only that Eberhardt carried out the bombardment “simultaneously with our landing” with a force of fourteen ships. There is also no information about any serious damage to the Turkish batteries. As in March, the aim was rather to unsettle the Turks than to destroy the fortifications.

Three divisions on the Bosporus

The significance of the Russian demonstrations lay elsewhere. The Turks could not ignore the threat of a landing at the very gates of Constantinople. According to the British official history, until the end of June they kept three divisions on the Bosporus, one on the Asian shore and two on the European, and moved 28 guns of 152 mm calibre from the fortifications at Çatalca to defend the entrance to the strait. Corbett believed that this meant a serious weakening of the forces with which the Turks could defend the Dardanelles.

When it became clear that the Allies were stuck at Gallipoli, de Robeck asked Eberhardt for even stronger pressure on the Bosporus. Russian battleships returned to the strait on 2 and 3 May and for several hours shelled the batteries on both its shores. During the next expedition, on 10 May, the Battle of the Bosporus took place, in which Russian battleships hit the Goeben. The Russians did not carry out a real landing on the Bosporus in 1915.