Monro and Birdwood receive new commands

Early on the morning of 4 November 1915 an urgent personal telegram from the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, for General William Birdwood reached the headquarters of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force on the island of Imbros. The cipher officer who, as was customary, was to decode it read the first groups of figures: “Most secret. Decipher yourself.” He took the message to the acting chief of staff, who, on reaching the words “Tell no one”, went in the dark to wake Birdwood. The general, however, did not know this cipher, and in the end, so as not to lose time, his staff decoded the message.

Kitchener’s telegram

Kitchener was writing to Birdwood, his long-serving staff officer, with whom he was on close terms. He announced that he was leaving to join him the following night, and revealed that the Admiralty would probably agree to a new attempt by the fleet to force the Dardanelles. Once the ships had entered the Sea of Marmara, the troops were to seize the Bulair isthmus at the neck of the peninsula, on the Gulf of Saros, in order to supply the fleet. Birdwood was to find the forces for this by reducing the trench garrisons to a minimum, perhaps even by abandoning Suvla. “We must do it right this time,” the minister concluded. “I absolutely refuse to sign orders for evacuation, which I think would be the gravest disaster and would condemn a large percentage of our men to death or imprisonment. Monro will be appointed to command the troops at Salonika.” Immediately afterwards came the official telegram from the War Office: Birdwood was to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and Monro was to take command at Salonika.

General Charles Monro, who had taken command on 28 October and three days later had recommended the evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula, was then on his way to Egypt. On 3 November he had handed temporary command to Birdwood and sailed for Cairo to discuss with the commander in Egypt, General John Maxwell, how an evacuation would affect Egypt and the Arab world. In Egypt he learnt that his advice had ended with his command being taken from him. The British official history observes that for a general who had been torn from his coveted post in France only to advise the government, it must have been bitter news. He was also told that, since the French cared more about the number of troops at Salonika than their quality, three tired divisions from the Dardanelles would go to Greece, and Birdwood would receive two regular divisions, the 27th and 28th, in exchange.

Birdwood’s loyalty

Birdwood, who had already been in temporary command after Ian Hamilton’s departure, did not welcome the appointment. He opposed evacuation, but he had always considered a landing at Bulair hopeless, and he replied to Kitchener that such an attempt could only end in disaster. He added: “I sincerely trust that Monro will remain in command here. He has already won the confidence of those who have seen him, and his experience in France, which I lack, will be absolutely invaluable. I know he will carry out any orders of the government better than I could.” He also refused to publish the War Office order until he had personally persuaded Kitchener to change his decision. The two officers who had seen the telegram had to swear to keep it secret. Bean, Australia’s official historian, writes that Birdwood was genuinely troubled by the way his old chief had treated Monro merely for honestly stating his opinion. He adds, however, that Birdwood was later criticised, perhaps not without reason, for letting personal considerations, however unselfish, guide him in so important a matter.

The plan behind the new appointments in any case collapsed that same day. On the evening of 4 November Kitchener, just before leaving London, telegraphed Birdwood that the fleet would most probably not attack and told him quietly to prepare a plan for withdrawing the troops. The appointments formally stood, but the change remained on paper. At Salonika the order for Monro to take command with the staff of XII Corps arrived only on 14 November, and Monro never took up the post. British troops there remained under General Bryan Mahon. When Kitchener met both generals at Mudros, he took Birdwood’s advice and at the end of November left Monro in charge of all British forces in the eastern Mediterranean.