First meeting of the War Committee

On 3 November 1915 the first meeting of the War Committee, a new body of the British government which replaced the Dardanelles Committee, was held in London. The day before, Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith had announced in the House of Commons that the strategic direction of the war would be taken over by a small committee of between three and five members. It was to deal with the day-to-day business of the war without referring to the whole 21-member cabinet, but was to inform the cabinet of its decisions and consult it before any change of policy. The British official history of the naval war points out that this was a return to the practice of the great wars of the past, when even the small cabinets of the time had proved too large for the rapid handling of war business.

According to the same history, the original members of the committee were Asquith as chairman, the First Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Balfour, the Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener, the Foreign Secretary Edward Grey and the Minister of Munitions David Lloyd George. Its secretary was Maurice Hankey, who had earlier kept the minutes of the War Council and the Dardanelles Committee. At the first meeting, as this history states, only the prime minister, Kitchener and Balfour were present. The Australian official history dates this meeting to 2 November, but the British official histories, the memoirs of Winston Churchill and the catalogue of the British National Archives all agree on 3 November.

Evacuate or strike once more?

The only, but most difficult, subject was the fate of Gallipoli. On 31 October General Charles Monro, the new commander on the peninsula, had recommended evacuation. He wrote that the troops were too exhausted and had lost too many officers to undertake a new effort with any prospect of success. The next day the commander in Egypt, General John Maxwell, protested, fearing the consequences of a withdrawal for the defence of Egypt, and London asked Monro for the views of the corps commanders. The replies arrived just before the meeting and were not unanimous. General Julian Byng, commanding at Suvla, believed that his sector could be abandoned without great losses if it was done before German reinforcements arrived. General Francis Davies at Helles agreed with Monro. General William Birdwood at Anzac admitted that the situation was serious, but feared the loss of prestige and the losses in a withdrawal, and so opposed evacuation.

The ministers also had before them an entirely different proposal. On 28 October Commodore Roger Keyes, chief of staff of the fleet at the Dardanelles, had come to London with a plan for a new attempt by warships to force the straits. At dawn, under cover of smoke screens and the fire of monitors, several old battleships were to pass through the minefields and the Narrows and then cut the Ottoman troops on the peninsula off from their supplies. The plan was supported by Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, but the fleet commander, Admiral John de Robeck, would not recommend it, considering the risk out of proportion to the possible gains. The Admiralty War Staff took no clear position.

Kitchener goes himself

Keyes’s enthusiasm impressed the ministers. According to the British official history, it made Kitchener even more determined not to sign an evacuation order. The committee concluded that with such conflicting opinions it could not take a final decision, and that the matter was too complex to be settled on military assessments alone. It was decided to ask Kitchener to go to the Mediterranean himself and report on the whole situation, including Egypt. Churchill later wrote bitterly that the new committee “had no difficulty in deciding to postpone the evil day of decision”.

That same day Kitchener sent Birdwood a telegram, quoted by the Australian official history: “I leave tomorrow night. I have seen Captain Keyes, and I believe the Admiralty will agree to making a naval attempt to force the Straits.” He announced that Birdwood would take command of all the troops and that Monro would go to Salonika, and ended: “I absolutely refuse to sign orders for evacuation, which I think would be the gravest disaster.” Soon, however, he learned that the naval attack was unlikely to be approved, and in a further telegram told Birdwood quietly to prepare a plan for withdrawing the troops. The Admiralty did not give up at once, however. On 4 November it informed de Robeck that it was sending him four battleships under Rear-Admiral Sydney Fremantle. That same day Kitchener left London.

The composition of the committee was still changing. On 11 November the cabinet again took up the question of its membership. According to Churchill, under Conservative pressure Andrew Bonar Law joined it, and according to some studies so did the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna. Churchill, left out, resigned in mid-November. On 23 November, after receiving Kitchener’s telegram from the island of Lemnos, the committee recommended to the cabinet the evacuation of the whole peninsula.