Start of the Erzurum offensive

The British chronology of the war records under 11 January 1916 the start of the Russian offensive towards the fortress of Erzurum in eastern Anatolia. According to the history of the Caucasian wars by W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, the first attack went in a day earlier, on 10 January, and on 11 January the fighting was in full swing. In Russia, which then used the Julian calendar, these were 28 and 29 December 1915, which is why in Russian sources the offensive begins in the old year. The commander of the Russian Caucasus Army, General Nikolai Yudenich, chose the moment deliberately: Orthodox Christmas and New Year, in the middle of a harsh winter on the Armenian Highlands, when no one expected any operations.

A race against time

Since Enver Pasha’s defeat at Sarikamish at the turn of 1914 and 1915, the main Caucasus front, between the Aras valley and Erzurum, had barely moved. At the end of 1915, however, Yudenich knew that time was working against him. After the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac the Turks could move experienced divisions from the Dardanelles to Asia. Yudenich calculated that it would take them about three months to reach Erzurum, and decided to destroy the Ottoman 3rd Army before then. The plan was approved at the turn of December and January in Tiflis by the Viceroy of the Caucasus, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich. The corps commanders received written orders only on 9 January.

The preparations were kept secret. The regiments sent officers to Tiflis to do their Christmas shopping, a rumour was spread of troops being transferred to Persia, and for the last five days no one was allowed to pass between the front and the rear. The Turks suspected nothing. The commander of the 3rd Army, Mahmud Kâmil Pasha, was on leave in Constantinople, and his German chief of staff was in Germany recovering from typhus. The army was temporarily commanded by Abdul Kerim Pasha.

Frost on the Karadağ

The first blow was a feint. General Mikhail Przhevalsky’s II Turkestan Corps attacked on the northern sector of the front, between Lake Tortum and the valley of the Oltu River. The main objective was the high mountain of Karadağ, which the Russians called Haj-dag. Only a narrow ridge with steep precipices on both sides led up to it. The Turks had cut deep trenches into the rock, covered by two stone towers, and placed machine guns there, and even two mountain guns. The assaults of the Turkestan regiments broke down on 10 and 11 January under fire and in terrible frost. One battalion lost 300 men killed and frozen to death. Przhevalsky renewed the attacks for two more days, although their task had already been accomplished, and several hundred more soldiers died on the ridge.

As early as 11 January the Turks were convinced that their X Corps would hold the attack along the whole line. Abdul Kerim even considered moving his only reserve north, but in the afternoon he cancelled the order. East of the Oltu River, on the other hand, the Russians managed to pin down almost two Turkish divisions and shift some of their troops towards the Çakırbaba ridge, where Yudenich intended to break through the front. The next day, 12 January, I Caucasian Corps went over to the attack in the Aras valley. The real blow, prepared in secret in the mountains, was yet to come.