Austrian peace note

On 15 September 1918 the world learned the text of the note which the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, Baron István Burián, had sent the day before to the governments of all the belligerent states. Through neutral diplomats, among them Sweden, which represented Vienna’s interests in Washington, Burián proposed that delegates of all the warring parties should meet in some neutral country for a “confidential and non-binding” discussion of the basic principles of a future peace. Hostilities were to continue, and the delegates were merely to exchange their governments’ views and clarify disputed questions. A separate letter asking for support went through the nuncio in Vienna to Pope Benedict XV.

The note recalled the peace offer of the Central Powers of December 1916 and argued that since then the positions of the two camps had drawn closer. Burián cited the words of Arthur Balfour that Austria-Hungary should solve its internal problems itself, and Lloyd George’s assurance that the break-up of the monarchy was not a war aim. He considered the principles announced by President Woodrow Wilson in February and July acceptable, provided they were applied universally and with respect for the vital interests of states. The exchange of speeches so far had, according to the note, been merely “a series of monologues”, delivered with the crowds in mind and deepening misunderstandings. Therefore only direct and confidential talks between representatives of the governments could bring a compromise peace closer.

Vienna acted alone, against its ally’s wishes. Burián, convinced that the monarchy would not survive another winter of war, had pressed Berlin for a swift peace move ever since the conference at Spa, and Emperor Karl wanted it made by 3 September at the latest. The Germans played for time, hoping for an improvement in the situation at the front. They proposed that the meeting of the warring parties should instead be called by Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands. Burián considered this unrealistic. In talks in Vienna on 4 and 5 September the German state secretary Paul von Hintze asked only for a few days’ delay, until the German army had taken up positions on the Siegfried Line. According to Burián’s memoirs, the Germans refused to take part in the note, “grumbled a little” after it was published, but accepted the fact and officially supported the proposal. On 19 September Burián announced that the step had been taken after consultation with the allies and with their agreement in principle.

Washington’s answer was the quickest and the shortest. On 16 September at 6.20 p.m. the Swedish minister handed the note to the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, and at 6.45 p.m. Lansing announced on the President’s authority that the United States had only one reply to it. It had repeatedly and with entire candour stated the terms on which it would consider peace, and “can and will entertain no proposal for a conference” on a matter on which its position was so clear. Lansing handed a formal note to this effect to the Swede the next day. The British press praised Wilson for replying “by return of post”. Balfour said on 16 September that he saw in the proposal not the slightest hope of a real peace and regarded it as an attempt to weaken the Allies at the moment of their victories. Soon afterwards the French prime minister, Georges Clemenceau, declared in the Senate that the fight would go on until the enemy understood that there could be no bargaining between crime and right. The Italian government replied with a semi-official communiqué that the proposal had no genuine peaceful intent, and the Vatican decided not to speak out.

So the note achieved nothing, and in Germany and Austria the curt refusal deepened the gloom still further. Burián believed, however, that his step had at least clarified the situation: the Entente did not want a negotiated peace. Meanwhile on 15 September the front in Macedonia was broken at Dobro Pole, and at the beginning of October Germany and Austria-Hungary themselves turned to Wilson, this time asking for an armistice on the basis of his Fourteen Points.