Vienna decides on action against Serbia

On 14 July 1914 in Vienna the crisis that followed the Sarajevo assassination entered a new phase. That day the Austro-Hungarian political leadership settled that the monarchy would seek a confrontation with Serbia. This did not yet mean an immediate declaration of war, but the decision on the course of action had in practice been made: Serbia was to receive an ultimatum worded so that accepting it would be extremely difficult, while rejecting it could become grounds for the use of force.

The most important change concerned István Tisza, the Prime Minister of Hungary. In the preceding days he had been the chief opponent of a hasty war, because he feared intervention by Russia and the transformation of a Balkan conflict into a general European war. On 14 July, however, he gave way under the pressure of events and the arguments of the other decision-makers, concluding that a policy of restraint could weaken the monarchy’s position and even damage its relations with Germany.

This was the moment when the dispute within Vienna was politically closed. After the German “blank cheque” of 5 July, the advocates of a hard line, led by the Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold and the Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, gained the upper hand. There was no longer any serious debate about whether to strike at Serbia, but about how to do it in a diplomatically advantageous way: so that responsibility for breaking the peace could be shifted onto Belgrade.

At the same time Berlin was pressing Austria-Hungary not to turn back from the path it had chosen. The German leadership made it clear that the moment was favourable and that delay could weaken the political effect after Sarajevo. As a result, a plan matured in Vienna for an ultimatum with demands so harsh that Serbia would either reject them or accept them at the cost of its own sovereignty.

It is worth being precise: on 14 July the Common Ministerial Council did not formally meet; it sat on 7 and 19 July. The decision was reached in talks between Tisza and Berchtold. On that day the final text of the note had not yet been settled, as it was refined over the following days and formally approved only later. Yet it was on that day that the monarchy’s fundamental political line was decided. That is why 14 July 1914 can be regarded as one of the key moments when the diplomatic crisis ceased to be a dispute over the investigation after Sarajevo and became preparation for war with Serbia.