Kaiser promises Austria-Hungary full support

On 5 July 1914, in Potsdam, one of the most important decisions of the entire July Crisis was taken. That day the German Emperor Wilhelm II received special envoys of Emperor Franz Joseph and made it clear that Austria-Hungary could count on Berlin’s full support, even if action against Serbia led to serious European complications. In historiography this decision is known as the German “blank cheque”.

The Austro-Hungarian delegation came to Germany because Vienna wanted to be certain that, if it took a hard line against Serbia, it would not be left alone to face Russia. The Sarajevo assassination of 28 June had provided a convenient pretext, but the Austro-Hungarian leadership itself did not want to take the risk without first sounding out its ally’s position. Count Alexander Hoyos and Ambassador László Szögyény were therefore sent to Berlin and Potsdam with memoranda and a letter from Emperor Franz Joseph.

Wilhelm II responded very favourably. According to the account sent to Vienna, he held that the Habsburg monarchy should act quickly and decisively against Serbia, and that Germany would stand faithfully by it even if the matter turned into a conflict with Russia. The German leadership was then convinced that Russia was not yet ready for a great war, and that a swift Austro-Hungarian strike could be confined to a local conflict.

On the same day there were also talks involving the Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, and the most important military and naval advisers. In staff circles the mood was even more bellicose than in the Kaiser’s own entourage. Some German commanders believed that if a European war was bound to come sooner or later, 1914 was a more favourable moment for Germany than a later confrontation with a stronger Russia. This does not mean that everyone wanted a world war from the outset, but the readiness to take risks was certainly very high.

One more element was particularly significant: after the talks Wilhelm II left, as planned, on a cruise in northern waters. This was no mere detail of his calendar. The trip helped to keep up an appearance of calm and to reduce the impression that Berlin and Vienna were preparing a great trial of strength. It later became clear that keeping the Kaiser on the sidelines also had political significance: the German government machine wanted to keep its freedom of action while not alarming international opinion too early.

The significance of 5 July thus lay not in a formal declaration of war, but in removing Vienna’s most important doubt. Austria-Hungary received the signal that it could pursue a hard course towards Serbia without fear of losing German support. That is why the Potsdam decision is regarded as one of the decisive moments on the road to the ultimatum of 23 July, and ultimately to the outbreak of a European war.