First Battle of Kut

The First Battle of Kut gave the British control of the middle course of the Tigris. General Charles Townshend’s 6th (Poona) Division, reinforced by cavalry and part of the 12th Division, attacked the strongly fortified Turkish position at Es Sinn, a dozen or so kilometres below Kut. Townshend feinted an attack along the river and sent his main force by night round the marshes against the enemy’s left flank. On 28 September, after a whole day’s fighting in heat and dust and without water, British and Indian troops took the Turkish redoubts north of the river and beat off the Turkish reserve. During the night the Turks abandoned all their positions and withdrew up the Tigris, and on 29 September the British entered Kut. They did not, however, manage to destroy the Ottoman army. A few days later it halted at Ctesiphon, halfway to Baghdad.

Name and dates

The British official history (Moberly, The Campaign in Mesopotamia) calls this engagement the Battle of Kut and dates it to 28 September 1915. English-language literature also uses the name Battle of Es Sinn, after the embankment of an old canal along which the Turkish trenches ran on the right bank of the river. This name is used by the English and Turkish Wikipedias. The term “First Battle of Kut” distinguishes it from the fighting for the town in 1916–1917, including the siege that ended in April 1916 with the surrender of Townshend’s division.

We adopt the dates 27–29 September 1915. On 27 September General Fry’s brigade made the first, feint attack on the Turkish centre, and by night the main force set out on the turning movement. On 28 September the battle proper was fought. On the morning of 29 September it turned out that the Turks had withdrawn during the night, and the same day the British occupied Kut. The official history counts British losses from 26 September, when the troops approached the Turkish position and came within range of its guns. The pursuit upriver, which ended on 5 October at Aziziyah, is described as a consequence of the battle.

Background

After the capture of Nasiriyah in July 1915 the British controlled the whole vilayet of Basra. The commander of the forces in Mesopotamia, General John Nixon, had argued as early as June that Kut must be taken as well. The town lay only a few kilometres beyond the border of the vilayet, at the mouth of the Shatt al-Hai, a channel linking the Tigris with the Euphrates. According to Nixon, the Turks who were concentrating troops there threatened both Amara and Nasiriyah from it. Taking Kut would allow the British forces to be concentrated on a single line, the garrisons on the Euphrates to be reduced and the Turks to be cut off from the powerful Bani Lam tribe. On 27 July the Viceroy of India judged the occupation of Kut a “strategic necessity”. The Secretary of State for India, Austen Chamberlain, agreed on 6 August, but stipulated that there would be no reinforcements and insisted above all on the protection of the oil pipeline in Persia.

Townshend, who had been convalescing in India over the summer, returned to Basra on 21 August. Two days later he received an order whose aim was “to destroy and disperse the enemy” and to occupy Kut. He himself was more cautious than his superiors: in a letter to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff he wrote that what had been gained should be held and that there should be no further advance. On 6 September Nixon was forbidden by India to undertake operations above Kut without the consent of the Commander-in-Chief. By 11 September Townshend had assembled his forces at Ali al-Gharbi. For the first time in this campaign all three infantry brigades of the 6th Division were in one place. The troops marched along the river only from dawn until half past eight in the morning, because during the day thermometers showed 43–49 degrees Celsius in the shade. Even so, on 12 and 13 September the heat removed 101 men from the ranks. On 16 September the division halted at Sannaiyat, about 13 kilometres from the Turkish trenches. There it waited until 25 September for guns and supplies to be brought up by river steamer.

The Turkish position

The Ottoman forces in Iraq had been commanded since June by Colonel Nureddin Bey, later Nureddin Pasha. He had been appointed in April, after the suicide of Süleyman Askerî, defeated at Shaiba. For several months he had been preparing a position across the Tigris, about 11 kilometres east of Kut. On the right, southern bank the trenches stretched for about eight kilometres along the embankments of an old canal, called Es Sinn by the British. The embankments rose six metres above the flat plain and gave an excellent view and field of fire, and the flank rested on a large redoubt. The river was closed by a barrier of boats and steel cables, guarded by guns and trenches on both banks. On the left, northern bank the line stretched for about 11 kilometres and was divided into three sectors by the Horse Shoe and Suwada marshes. Furthest north, between the Suwada and Ataba marshes, stood three redoubts linked by trenches.

The British were impressed by the Turkish work. The trenches were carefully dug and camouflaged, protected by wire entanglements, pits and mines, and behind them ran kilometres of communication trenches and underground shelters. Pumps supplied the trenches with water from the river. The position had one serious flaw, however: the only boat bridge linking the two banks lay about eight kilometres to the rear, so moving reserves from one bank to the other took many hours.

Forces

According to the British official history Townshend had almost 11,000 men, 28 guns and 40 machine guns. Alongside the 16th, 17th and 18th Brigades of the 6th Division fought half of the 30th Brigade, brought in from the lines of communication, and three and a half squadrons of cavalry from the 7th Lancers and the 16th Cavalry. The division was accompanied by a flotilla of the armed launches Comet, Shaitan and Sumana and four 4.7-inch guns on barges. Captain Wilfrid Nunn, who had commanded the flotilla in the previous battles, was then in Ceylon, and his place was taken by Lieutenant-Commander Edgar Cookson. For reconnaissance the British had only three aeroplanes and two seaplanes. On 16 September one aeroplane had to land behind the Turkish lines and its crew was captured, but the airmen had managed to produce an accurate map of the Turkish fortifications. The battle was watched by Nixon, who arrived on 25 September aboard the steamer Malamir, announcing that he would not interfere with the command.

British intelligence believed that the right bank was held by the 35th Division and the left by the 38th Division, each of six battalions, with four battalions in reserve at the bridge and two cavalry regiments, a camel detachment and numerous Arab horsemen. It estimated the Turkish forces at no more than 6,000 infantry, three-quarters of them Arabs. After the battle it turned out that Nureddin had had 38 guns, not 25 as had been thought. More recent studies put his strength higher, at about 10,000 men.

Townshend’s plan

Townshend decided to exploit the fact that the Turks had divided their forces between the two banks of an unfordable river. The main blow was to fall on the Turkish left flank, north of the Suwada marsh. On 26 September the division approached Nukhailat, about six kilometres from the Turkish lines, and built a pontoon bridge there. General Walter Delamain’s Column “A” (the 16th and 17th Brigades, half of the 30th Brigade, the cavalry and most of the field artillery) camped on the right bank by the Chahela mounds. All available tents were pitched there, and the 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry dug in in full view of the Turks to convince Nureddin that the main attack would go along the river, as it had in July at Nasiriyah. General Charles Fry’s Column “B” (the 18th Brigade and the 48th Pioneers) was meanwhile to pin down the Turkish centre on the left bank.

Course: 27 September

On the morning of 27 September the 18th Brigade advanced against the Turkish centre by the Horse Shoe marsh on a very broad front, feigning the main attack “by show and ruse”. It was shelled by Turkish guns, for a time also from the armed steamer Pioneer. In the early afternoon the brigade dug in about 1,800 metres from the Turkish lines, losing only one man killed and 24 wounded. At the same time Delamain’s troops demonstrated on the right bank.

According to the official history, during the night before the battle several sepoys from beyond the Indian frontier deserted to the Turks and revealed that the main blow would fall on the left flank. Nureddin took this for a ruse and did not believe it. At dusk Delamain’s infantry crossed the bridge to the left bank and by midnight had assembled at Clery’s Post, on the south-eastern edge of the Suwada marsh. Only two battalions of the 30th Brigade remained on the right bank.

Course: 28 September

At two in the morning Delamain’s column set out for its starting position, about 4.5 kilometres east of the Turkish redoubts. The soldiers, dazed by the stifling, dusty air, fell asleep at every halt. At a quarter to five the head of the column reached the Suwaikiya marsh exactly where it was meant to. The plan provided for General Frederick Hoghton with six battalions (the 17th Brigade together with the 20th Punjabis and the 104th Rifles) to turn the Turkish flank from the north, while Delamain with the rest struck from the front. In the half-light, however, Hoghton’s troops lost their direction, following the cavalry, and entered the neck of land between the Ataba and Suwaikiya marshes. By the time they realised, they were already so far on that Hoghton preferred to go round the whole Ataba marsh and come out in the Turkish rear rather than turn back. This cost several hours.

Delamain could wait no longer. At 8.45 a.m. he threw half a battalion of the 117th Mahrattas, a company of sappers and a battalion of the Dorset Regiment, supported by two batteries, against the North Redoubt. The Turks defended themselves stubbornly, and the attackers advanced across a completely open plain. Just after ten the redoubt fell after bayonet fighting. The 103rd Mahrattas from Hoghton’s column, arriving from the north-west, helped in this. 135 Turks were taken prisoner. The Mahrattas lost half of the men who went into the attack. Earlier, at 9.10 a.m., the 104th Rifles had taken a previously unknown trench in the rear and captured 112 men. The Turks gave up the Central Redoubt almost without a fight, but at the South Redoubt they put up strong resistance and counter-attacked. A strong wind raised clouds of dust, and mirage made observation impossible for the gunners. Only when the guns had moved closer did the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire battalion, the 119th Infantry and the 103rd Mahrattas take the redoubt at about 12.45 p.m., capturing 300 prisoners.

Meanwhile Hoghton with the rest of his force beat off a Turkish detachment approaching from the south and pushed on along the rear of the Turkish position. At about 3.30 p.m. his soldiers, on their feet since two in the morning, were at the end of their strength. The water in the marshes, which the cavalry patrols had described as drinkable, turned out to be salt, and ammunition was running out. When they halted to rest not far from the Tigris, Turkish artillery opened fire on them, and the mules carrying water and ammunition stampeded. The cavalry, which in the morning had gone round the Turkish flank and reached almost as far as the Turkish camp by the bridge, also had to withdraw under fire.

Communications were the weakest point of the plan. At about 11 a.m. the telephone cable between Townshend’s headquarters and Delamain broke, and visual signalling was impossible in the dust and mirage. Messages were carried by aeroplanes and seaplanes. Without news of the progress of the turning movement Fry could not attack in earnest. His brigade, supported by the guns of the vessels, came within less than a kilometre of the Turkish trenches between the Suwada and Horse Shoe marshes, and in the evening within about 450 metres, but did not break through the defence.

At about 4.50 p.m. Delamain left the 119th on the captured redoubts and with the rest of his troops set off round the Suwada marsh to come out in the rear of the Turkish centre. At about 5.30 p.m., however, he saw strong Turkish reserves approaching from the south, probably from the right bank. The exhausted, thirsty soldiers changed front and advanced straight at the enemy, into the sun, through tall grass. The Turks took up positions in a dry canal, but the British artillery silenced their four guns, and the infantry charged with the bayonet from a few hundred metres and drove them out of the canal. The Turks lost all four guns and many men, but nightfall allowed them to escape. Delamain’s men were no longer capable of marching further. They spent the night on the battlefield, without food or water, shivering with cold, because the temperature fell by nearly 30 degrees.

At about 6 p.m. Townshend, convinced that the Turks would withdraw, suggested to the navy that it try to break through the barrier on the river and catch the Turkish steamers. After dark three launches approached without lights, but were detected and came under violent fire from both banks. The barrier consisted of an Arab boat (mahaila) and two iron barges linked by steel cables. Cookson had Comet run alongside the boat, and since sending a sailor meant certain death, he took an axe himself to cut the cables. Riddled with bullets, he died ten minutes later. He was awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously. Fourteen members of Comet’s crew were wounded and the flotilla turned back. At the same time the Turkish horsemen who had been missing from the battlefield were raiding the British rear near Sannaiyat, where they sank 15 boats carrying coal and oil for the vessels and captured a telegraph motor boat.

The Turkish retreat and the capture of Kut

Until morning Townshend did not know what had become of Delamain’s column. The officer sent to him had his horses shot under him and lay out all night on the plain. At dawn on 29 September Fry’s patrols and the aeroplanes established that the Turks had abandoned all their positions during the night and were falling back up the Tigris. Nureddin had skilfully extricated his troops from the Suwada area before the British could close the trap. In the morning the flotilla passed the barrier, where only two Turks with an old muzzle-loading gun remained, and at about ten reached Kut, three-quarters of an hour after Delamain’s cavalry. The town was occupied without a fight.

The pursuit proved difficult. Low water meant that the vessels kept running aground, and loading Fry’s brigade took until the evening. On 30 September Comet and Shaitan caught up with the Turkish steamers Pioneer and Basra, but had to turn back under fire from the Turkish rearguard. The cavalry caught up with the Turks on 1 October about 65 kilometres above Kut, but they were withdrawing in good order, covered by a strong rearguard. On 3 October the airmen reported that the Turks had occupied a previously prepared position at Ctesiphon, and on 5 October Townshend halted at Aziziyah, about a hundred kilometres by land (over 160 kilometres by river) above Kut, and waited for Nixon’s decisions.

Losses

According to the British official history the British and Indians lost 1,233 men from 26 to 28 September, of whom only 94 were killed. This low proportion of killed was explained by the fact that the Turkish loopholes had been built so that the soldiers would not fire too high, as a result of which many of the attackers were wounded in the legs. Five-sixths of the losses fell on Delamain’s battalions. The worst hit was the half battalion of the 117th Mahrattas, which went into action 225 strong and lost 114. Townshend had told the doctors to prepare for losses of the order of 6 per cent, but they were almost twice as high. The makeshift medical arrangements could not cope, as later evidence before the commission investigating the conduct of the Mesopotamian campaign showed. Some of the wounded on the battlefield were murdered by Arab marauders. Three caught in the act were publicly hanged by the British.

The official history estimates Turkish losses at about 4,000 men, including 1,153 prisoners. The British captured 14 guns, many rifles and a great deal of ammunition and stores. Some studies give higher figures, up to about 5,300 killed, wounded and captured.

Significance

The victory at Kut was the most brilliant British success in Mesopotamia in 1915. In his report Nixon praised Townshend for the manoeuvre that made it possible to take a strong position without very heavy losses, and the soldiers for their dash. The battle did not, however, fulfil the main aim set in the order: the Ottoman army had not been destroyed. It got away in good order and at Ctesiphon, where reinforcements began to reach it, prepared a new line of defence. The battle also exposed the weaknesses of the British expedition: insufficient river and land transport, an inadequate medical service and an ever-longer line of communications. According to Nixon, the occupation of Kut alone lengthened it by about 250 kilometres, counting from Amara.

In Simla and in London the victory was read as proof of Turkish weakness. As early as August Nixon had argued that the best way to pacify Persia would be to take Baghdad, and the Viceroy of India wrote that nothing would impress the Afghans, Persians and Arabs as much as the fall of that city. After the battle the idea gained even more supporters. Townshend was sceptical. In November, however, his division set out for Baghdad and was stopped at Ctesiphon, and then withdrew to Kut, where from December 1915 it was besieged until its surrender in April 1916.