Entente urges Greece to help Serbia

On 15 February 1915 the British minister in Athens, Sir Francis Elliot, and his French colleague presented the Greek prime minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, with a joint démarche from the Entente. Greece was to come to Serbia’s aid, and Britain, France and Russia undertook to send one division each to Salonika to secure the Greek rear and lines of communication. Venizelos rejected the proposal the same day, without even consulting the King.

A plan from London

It was already the second appeal to Athens within three weeks. At the end of January London had promised Greece gains in Asia Minor in return for help to Serbia, but in the face of Romania’s refusal and the King’s opposition Greece did not move. Meanwhile reports were reaching the Entente that Austria-Hungary and Germany were preparing a new attack on Serbia, and Bulgaria had just accepted German money. In London the idea of sending troops to the Balkans had for weeks been backed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, who saw it as a way of drawing Greece, Romania and perhaps even Bulgaria into the war.

On 8 February the French foreign minister, Théophile Delcassé, agreed in London with Prime Minister Asquith, Edward Grey, Lord Kitchener and Winston Churchill that Serbia must be promised two divisions, one French and one British, as quickly as possible. The next day the British War Council dealt only with the details. Russia announced that it had no infantry to spare but could send a thousand Cossacks. Kitchener proposed sending to Salonika the 29th Division, the last regular division remaining in England, and sending one of the Territorial divisions to France in its place.

Grey’s telegram

Still on 9 February Grey sent the text of the démarche to Athens. It began by stating that “every obligation of honour and interest” required Greece to hasten to Serbia’s aid. So that she could do so effectively and secure her communications, Britain, France and Russia proposed to send a division each to Salonika, and if the Russian contingent was delayed, the British and French divisions were to set off at once. Greece was to declare herself immediately, even before the Allied troops arrived. Already at the War Council meeting Churchill had doubted whether such modest terms would persuade the Greeks.

Elliot had doubts too. On 10 February he warned London that the announcement of troops for Salonika would be badly received in Athens, because Venizelos had already said that two divisions would not secure the Greek flank against the Bulgarians. He advised starting with a more modest request for permission for Entente troops to pass through Salonika to Serbia, without demanding the participation of the Greek army. Grey did not change his mind. The démarche was delivered only on 15 February, when the French minister had received his instructions from Paris.

Refusal

Venizelos replied at once. He considered two divisions a wholly inadequate force to shield Greece from a Bulgarian attack, and called entering the war on such terms suicide. He also repeated what he had said in January: Greek co-operation was out of the question until Romania entered the war, and not merely by attacking Austria-Hungary in Transylvania, but by acting together with the Greek forces. Venizelos later told the Serbian minister that if the Entente had asked only for free passage for its troops, it would have been quite another matter.

The refusal sealed the fate of the whole undertaking. The British official history of the Dardanelles campaign recorded that the Salonika project had to be abandoned and attention turned to the Dardanelles. The fleet’s attack on the Turkish forts, originally planned for 15 February itself, was postponed by a few days. Entente troops landed at Salonika only in October 1915, when Austria-Hungary, Germany and Bulgaria attacked Serbia simultaneously. By then it was too late to help.