British offer to Greece

On 24 January 1915 the British minister in Athens, Sir Francis Elliot, passed on to the Greek prime minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, a proposal from the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. If Greece stood by Serbia as her ally and entered the war, France and Russia would gladly agree to her receiving “very important territorial concessions” on the coast of Asia Minor. Grey had sent the instructions to Athens a day earlier, on 23 January, which is why some studies give the offer that date.

Serbia in danger

In December the Serbs had routed Potiorek’s armies on the Kolubara, but the victory cost them dearly. The Serbian army was exhausted, short of ammunition and equipment, and an epidemic of typhus was spreading through the country. In the Entente capitals it was believed that Austria-Hungary, this time supported by the Germans, would soon renew the attack. Help was once again sought from Serbia’s neighbours. At the beginning of December Entente diplomats had already sought it in Athens, Sofia and Bucharest, but Venizelos refused to send troops as long as Bulgaria threatened him from the north. This time London decided to win the Greeks over with the promise of gains.

Content of the offer

Grey justified the haste by arguing that while Serbia’s defeat would not change the final outcome of the war, it would create accomplished facts in the Balkans after which Serbia and Greece could hardly count on favourable settlements. The immediate entry of Greece and Romania into the war, on the other hand, would seal Austria-Hungary’s defeat. For such participation to be effective, Bulgaria should be given an assurance that if Serbia and Greece satisfied their aspirations elsewhere, she would receive compensation in Macedonia. The condition was her entry into the war against Turkey, or at least benevolent neutrality. The concessions in Macedonia, however, were to be made chiefly by Serbia. From Venizelos Grey wanted only that he should not oppose them.

The offer was vague and named no towns or borders. For the Greeks, however, it was the first clear sign that the Entente allowed for a partition of the Asian possessions of the Ottoman Empire and that Greece might take part in it. Hundreds of thousands of Greeks lived on the western coast of Asia Minor, especially around Smyrna, and already in 1914 the Ottoman authorities had deported many of them from there.

Venizelos’s memorandum

Venizelos decided that such an opportunity must not be missed. That same day he presented King Constantine I with a lengthy memorandum. In it he wrote that for the first time Greece was being called to war not only to fulfil her obligations to her Serbian ally, but in return for gains that could create a “great and powerful Greece”. He also warned that neutrality would not bring security. If Serbia were crushed, the armies of the Central Powers might reach as far as Salonika, and Bulgaria might occupy Serbian Macedonia. Greece would then have either to break her alliance with Serbia or to come to her aid in far worse conditions.

The most surprising was the proposal regarding Bulgaria. Until then Athens had firmly opposed any major concessions to the Bulgarians that would upset the balance established in the Balkans in 1913. Now Venizelos was ready not only to agree to Serbian concessions in Macedonia, even up to the right bank of the Vardar, but also to propose ceding to the Bulgarians Kavala, a port Greece had won only two years earlier. The price was to be Bulgaria’s active entry into the war on the side of the Entente, not mere neutrality. Bulgaria was to buy out the property of Greeks who wished to leave the ceded area, and the populations of the two states were to be exchanged under the supervision of an international commission. In return Greece wanted the area of Doiran and Gevgelija from Serbia.

Venizelos admitted that the Bulgarians might not let themselves be bought with any concessions. In that case Greece should at least secure the cooperation of Romania, because without it taking part in the war would be too risky. Whether the British offer had any significance at all therefore depended on the answer from Bucharest. According to later accounts, the King would not hear of giving up Greek land, but allowed for help to Serbia if Romania moved together with Greece. Bulgaria could then be held in check by Romanian and Greek troops left on her northern and southern borders.