Fleet attack in the Dardanelles repulsed

On 18 March 1915 the British and French fleet made its greatest attempt to break through the defences of the Dardanelles. Sixteen battleships were to silence the forts at the Narrows by Çanakkale and open a way through the minefields for the minesweepers. After several hours of bombardment that seemed to be taking effect, the ships began, one after another, to blow up on mines whose existence no one had known of. By evening three battleships had sunk and three others had been badly damaged. It was the worst day of the whole naval operation, which had begun on 19 February with the bombardment of the forts at the entrance to the strait.

De Robeck’s plan

The attack was commanded by Vice-Admiral John de Robeck, who had taken over just beforehand from the sick Admiral Sackville Carden. The plan, prepared by Carden’s staff, divided the fleet into three divisions. The first, under de Robeck’s direct command, comprised the four most powerful ships: the dreadnought Queen Elizabeth, which flew his flag, the battlecruiser Inflexible and the battleships Agamemnon and Lord Nelson. The second division was made up of older British battleships under Captain Hayes-Sadler of Ocean, among them Triumph and Swiftsure, which three days earlier had been recalled from Smyrna. The third consisted of Rear-Admiral Émile Guépratte’s four French battleships: Suffren, Bouvet, Gaulois and Charlemagne.

The first line, from a long range of about 13 kilometres, was to bombard the main forts of the Narrows. Once their fire slackened, the French ships were to pass through the British line and engage at close range. After a few hours the French were to be relieved by the British second division. It was expected that after two hours of bombardment the minesweepers could begin clearing a channel through the minefield off Kephez and finish the work at night under the cover of two more battleships. The plan was discussed with the ships’ captains on 16 March aboard Queen Elizabeth, and on the evening of 17 March, when the weather forecast proved favourable, the orders were issued.

Before noon

The morning was clear and windless. The minesweepers reported that during the night they had found no mines up to about 8 kilometres from the forts of the Narrows. The waters in which the ships were to manoeuvre were therefore considered safe. At about 10.30 a.m. the first division entered the strait, coming under fire on the way from mobile howitzers on the Asian shore. According to the British official history, the ships opened fire on the forts at about 11.30 a.m., although some accounts give an earlier time. Queen Elizabeth took as her target the German-manned Fort Hamidiye I on the Asian side, and the other ships the forts Rumeli Mecidiye, Namazgâh and Hamidiye II. At about noon there was a huge explosion in Fort Çimenlik next to Çanakkale itself.

The forts replied weakly, but the hidden howitzers and field guns were increasingly troublesome. The battleship Agamemnon was hit twelve times in less than half an hour, although most of the shells did her no serious damage. On Inflexible a shell set the forward bridge on fire, and the flames spread to the fighting top, which was full of wounded. The captain had to take the ship out of the line for a time.

A few minutes after noon de Robeck signalled to the French division. Guépratte led his ships to about 9 kilometres from the forts. Here the Turkish fire proved dangerous. Bouvet lost two casemates, and a fire broke out on her bridge. Gaulois took a heavy hit in the bow, shipped water and began to list. Nevertheless, at about 1.45 p.m. the fire of the forts had weakened enough for de Robeck to call in the minesweepers and order Hayes-Sadler’s division to relieve the French.

The loss of Bouvet

The French ships withdrew along the Asian shore, through Eren Köy Bay. A few minutes before 2 p.m. a column of reddish-black smoke rose beneath the battleship Bouvet, followed at once by a second, even higher one. The ship heeled over, capsized and sank within one, at most two minutes. Depending on the source, from more than 600 to about 660 sailors went down with her, including her captain, Capitaine de vaisseau Rageot de la Touche. Destroyers and boats from the British ships managed to pick up only a few dozen survivors.

Observers did not know whether Bouvet had been hit by a shell or a mine, and even suspected a torpedo fired from the shore. In Turkey it is still said that the fire of Turkish batteries contributed to her sinking, but most historians believe that Bouvet struck a mine. On the night of 7–8 March the small Turkish minelayer Nusret, commanded by Lieutenant Hakkı Bey, had laid a line of 26 mines (20 according to the British official history) in Eren Köy Bay, parallel to the shore. They lay exactly where the Allied ships had been turning after their bombardments for a week. The British minesweepers had not detected them.

An afternoon among the mines

At 2.39 p.m. the British second line, with Ocean, Irresistible, Albion and Vengeance, opened fire on the forts. The ships did not break off the attack, although their crews had seen Bouvet sink. On the Asian shore Fort Hamidiye I was still firing and concentrated on the battleship Irresistible. The minesweepers, which had meanwhile begun work, swept up several mines, and some of them came to the surface. The British concluded that the Turks were releasing floating mines to drift down with the current.

At about 4 p.m. Inflexible, which had earlier returned to her station, struck a mine. The explosion killed everyone in the forward compartment. The ship listed and settled by the bow, but set off towards the island of Tenedos. A quarter of an hour or so later a mine went off under the engine room of the battleship Irresistible. The engine rooms flooded, the ship lost power and drifted, listing, under a hail of Turkish shells. The destroyer Wear took off more than 600 men, leaving ten volunteers on board to prepare a tow.

Only when Wear came alongside Queen Elizabeth with the survivors did de Robeck learn that here too a mine had been the cause. He ordered the ships to withdraw and told Ocean to take Irresistible in tow if possible. This proved impossible, so at about 5.50 p.m. Irresistible was abandoned and de Robeck signalled the whole fleet to retire. At about 6.05 p.m., as Ocean was steaming away under the fire of Turkish batteries, she too struck a mine. Almost at the same moment a shell flooded the steering-engine compartment. Her crew was taken off by the destroyers Colne, Jed and Chelmer.

During the night destroyers and minesweepers returned to the strait to try to tow away the abandoned ships. The fleet’s chief of staff, Commodore Roger Keyes, took part in the search. Neither ship was found. According to Turkish records Irresistible sank at about 7.30 p.m., and Ocean, carried by the current into Morto Bay, at about 10.30 p.m.

The day’s toll

Thanks to the efforts of her engineers Inflexible reached Tenedos, but could sail to Malta for repairs only after a temporary patch had been fitted. Suffren, leaking at the bow, needed docking. Gaulois was in such a bad state that she had to be beached on one of the nearby islets. Of the sixteen battleships three had sunk, and three more were out of action for a long time. British losses in men were relatively small, counted in dozens of dead, but together with Bouvet’s crew the Allies lost about 700 men. The Turks lost, according to the figures most often given, about 120 killed and wounded.

Turkish reports spoke of heavy damage in the forts: barracks burned down, an ammunition store exploded at Çimenlik, and both guns were destroyed at Hamidiye II. Only one heavy gun, however, was permanently lost, and some of the damaged ones were repaired during the night. The most important minefields off Kephez remained untouched. The Turks were short of modern ammunition for their heavy guns, but according to their official returns each of them still had an average of about 70 rounds after the battle. The hero of the Turkish legend of that day was Corporal Seyit of the Rumeli Mecidiye battery, who is said to have carried a heavy shell to the gun by himself after the ammunition hoist was damaged. Popular stories credit him with hitting Ocean, which has never been confirmed.

The course of the day was watched by General Ian Hamilton, who had arrived at the Dardanelles the day before to take command of the land forces. He became convinced that the hidden batteries could not be destroyed without a landing. For a long time the British believed that the ships had been sunk by floating mines. Only after the war was it confirmed that the cause of the defeat was a single line of mines laid by Nusret ten days earlier.