Germany delivers an ultimatum to Belgium

At 7 p.m. Belgian time on 2 August 1914 the German Minister in Brussels, Claus von Below-Saleske, handed the Belgian Foreign Minister, Julien Davignon, a “very confidential” note. Germany demanded that Belgium let its troops pass through Belgian territory. It gave twelve hours for a reply.

A note from a sealed envelope

The document had not been written that day. The first draft was written in his own hand on 26 July by the Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke. The text was revised by officials of the Auswärtiges Amt and by Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, and on 29 July a courier took it to Brussels in a sealed envelope. The minister was to keep it locked up and open it only when instructed by telegraph.

The instruction came on 2 August. The Secretary of State, Gottlieb von Jagow, ordered the note to be delivered at 8 p.m. German time, but made two changes. He struck out the promise that Germany would support any Belgian claims to territorial compensation at the expense of France, and he cut the time allowed for a reply from 24 to 12 hours. Below was to assure the Belgians that the German information about French plans was certain, and to suggest that the government withdraw with its troops to Antwerp. The Belgians were to be left believing that the instructions had arrived only that day. The reply was to be sent at once by car to General Otto von Emmich at the Union Hotel in Aachen. Emmich was to lead the first attack on Liège.

The text of the note

The note began by asserting that the German government had reliable information that French forces intended to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. Germany feared that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, would be unable to repel such an invasion unaided, and it was “essential for the self-defence of Germany” to anticipate the hostile attack. The German government would feel “the deepest regret” if Belgium regarded Germany’s entry into its territory as an act of hostility.

Germany then made four declarations. If Belgium maintained “an attitude of friendly neutrality” towards it, at the conclusion of peace Germany would guarantee its possessions and independence in full. On the conclusion of peace it would evacuate Belgian territory. It would pay cash for everything its troops needed and make good any damage. If, however, Belgium resisted, in particular by defending the fortresses on the Meuse or destroying railways, roads, tunnels or other works, it would be treated as an enemy, and the future relations of the two states would be “left to the decision of arms”.

The demand rested on a pretext. France had assured Belgium on 1 August that it would respect its neutrality, and a march through Belgium had for years been the basis of the German war plan. Prussia was one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality under the Treaty of London of 1839.

The first reaction

Below reported to Berlin that Davignon could not conceal his “pained surprise”. The minister said only that he would immediately inform the King and the Cabinet, and that a reply would come within twelve hours. Shortly before, Below had told him that he had received no instructions but personally believed Belgium could feel secure as regards its eastern neighbour. In the evening ministers and senior officers gathered at the palace of King Albert I to decide on the reply.

For Germany time was what counted. The reply had to be in Berlin by 2 p.m. the next day at the latest, and Emmich was waiting in Aachen, just across the Belgian frontier. The next day the British House of Commons learned of the ultimatum to Belgium, and it was this that decided London’s position.