Tsar orders general mobilisation of the Russian army

On the afternoon of 30 July 1914 Tsar Nicholas II agreed to a general mobilisation of the Russian army. Only a day earlier he had halted the same decision at the last moment, confining himself to a partial mobilisation against Austria-Hungary. This time he did not change his mind.

Why partial mobilisation was not enough

From the outset the Russian military argued that mobilising only the districts facing Austria-Hungary was unworkable. The plans provided for the mobilisation of the whole army, and an improvised solution could paralyse later operations if Germany entered the war. Berlin, meanwhile, warned that further Russian preparations would force it to mobilise itself. In St Petersburg it was increasingly believed that war with Germany was now almost unavoidable, and that every day of delay worked to the enemy’s advantage.

The conversation at Peterhof

At about 3 p.m. the Foreign Minister, Sergey Sazonov, arrived to see the Tsar at Peterhof. He argued that general mobilisation was necessary because Germany was determined to bring about war. Nicholas II hesitated for a long time. According to Sazonov’s account, he spoke of the responsibility being placed on him and of the thousands of men who would be sent to their deaths. At about 4 p.m. he gave way.

Sazonov immediately telephoned the decision to the Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Yanushkevich. The general had said earlier that once he received the approval he would smash his telephone and disappear, so that no one could cancel it again in time. At about 5 p.m. the official order was issued, and in the evening the mobilisation telegrams were sent out to all the military districts of the empire. The first day of mobilisation was 31 July.

A step that could not be undone

The general mobilisation of Russia was a decision of fundamental importance. The German Schlieffen Plan assumed that in a two-front war Germany must first defeat France quickly, before Russia could mobilise its enormous forces. From the point of view of the German General Staff, every day of Russian mobilisation shortened the time available to carry out this plan.

Berlin’s reaction was swift. On 31 July Germany proclaimed a state of imminent danger of war and sent Russia an ultimatum demanding that mobilisation be halted. When St Petersburg did not accept it, Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August. The decision taken at Peterhof on 30 July settled that the conflict would cease to be a war in the Balkans and become a war of the great powers.