Russia begins general mobilisation

31 July 1914 – 18 July under the Julian calendar then in use in Russia – was the first day of the general mobilisation of the army and navy of the Russian Empire. Tsar Nicholas II had agreed to it the previous day at Peterhof, and the telegrams had gone out that evening to all the military districts. In the morning notices of the mobilisation were posted in the streets of St Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Friedrich Szapáry, reported to Vienna that the city was receiving the mobilisation orders “in moody silence”.

Why the whole army

The Russian government explained to its allies that it had had no choice. The British Ambassador, George Buchanan, telegraphed that the decision had been taken after a report from the Russian ambassador in Vienna: Austria-Hungary was determined not to yield to the mediation of the powers and was moving troops against Russia as well. Russia also had reason to believe that Germany was making active military preparations, and could not afford to let her get a start. The French Ambassador, Maurice Paléologue, wrote in similar terms: for strategic reasons Russia could no longer delay turning its partial mobilisation into a general one. Paléologue, and after him the French Prime Minister René Viviani, also presented the Russian decision as a response to general mobilisation in Austria-Hungary. In fact Vienna ordered it only on 31 July, the day after the Tsar’s decision.

Sazonov did not break off talks. That day he handed the British and French ambassadors a new formula, agreed with London: if Austria halted the march of her troops on Serbian territory and agreed that the Great Powers should examine what satisfaction Serbia could give her without injury to her sovereignty, Russia would maintain a waiting attitude. The Russian minister also thanked Great Britain for its firm attitude and proposed that further talks be held in London.

Telegrams that crossed

The German Ambassador, Count Friedrich von Pourtalès, sent the news of the mobilisation at 10.20 a.m. It reached the German Foreign Office in Berlin at 11.40 a.m. Pourtalès also asked for an audience with the Tsar and drove to Peterhof. He argued that mobilisation against Germany in the middle of a German mediation would be taken as a provocation, and begged that it be stopped. Nicholas II replied that for technical reasons this was no longer possible. Pourtalès left with the impression that the Tsar still did not grasp the gravity of the situation.

In the afternoon the Tsar and Emperor Wilhelm II exchanged telegrams that crossed on the way. Wilhelm, sending his at 2.04 p.m., wrote that he was receiving reliable news of serious preparations for war on his eastern frontier, and that responsibility for the safety of his empire forced preventive measures of defence upon him. The peace of Europe, he added, could still be preserved by the Tsar if Russia stopped the military measures threatening Germany and Austria-Hungary. Nicholas II wrote: “It is technically impossible to stop our military preparations which were obligatory owing to Austria’s mobilisation. We are far from wishing war. So long as the negotiations with Austria on Serbia’s account are taking place my troops shall not take any provocative action. I give you my solemn word for this.”

Berlin’s reply

In Berlin these assurances were not believed. That same day Germany proclaimed a state of imminent danger of war, and an ultimatum was sent to Pourtalès. The ambassador received it at 11.10 p.m. and presented it to Sazonov at midnight. The minister again cited the technical impossibility of halting the mobilisation and the Tsar’s word. Asked whether he could guarantee that Russia would keep the peace even if no agreement with Vienna was reached, he could not give an affirmative answer.

The mobilisation went ahead according to plan. By the time Germany began its own, the Russian military machine had already been running for two days. In mid-August Russian troops entered East Prussia.