Entente ultimatum to Greece

On 21 June 1916, or 8 June by the Julian calendar then used in Greece, the ministers of France, Great Britain and Russia handed the Greek government a joint note. They acted in it as representatives of the protecting powers, which in 1827–1832 had helped the Greeks win their independence and had guaranteed the existence of the Kingdom of Greece. They demanded the immediate demobilisation of the army, the replacement of the government by a cabinet without political colour, the dissolution of parliament and new elections, and the removal of certain police officials. They allowed neither discussion nor delay. The British chronology of the war records that the demands were accepted. Although the note set no deadline, in practice it was an ultimatum: behind the diplomats stood a fleet ready for action.

The fleet in Milos Bay

Since the surrender of Fort Rupel to the Bulgarians at the end of May, the Allies had been increasing the pressure. General Maurice Sarrail declared a state of siege in Salonika, and Entente warships were stopping Greek ships. On 9 June the British Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, instructed the minister in Athens, Francis Elliot, to present the Greeks with a note in line with a draft by the French Foreign Ministry. According to the British official history of the operations in Macedonia, the final text, harsher than the version agreed by the two ministries, was written on the spot by the three ministers: Elliot, the Frenchman Jean Guillemin and the Russian, Prince Elim Demidov. The governments approved it afterwards.

At the same time a force was being prepared. The French Vice-Admiral Moreau took command of the ships assigned to a demonstration off Athens, and Sarrail sent troops from Salonika to embark as landing parties. According to the British official history of naval operations, by 20 June French and British ships had assembled in the bay of the island of Milos in the Cyclades. The note was to be delivered when the fleet entered Phaleron Bay near Athens. Moreau, however, did not want to take large ships in there until the entrance had been secured with anti-submarine nets, and on the day the note was delivered the fleet was still lying off Milos. The British writer George F. Abbott, sympathetic to the king, claims on the basis of the memoirs of Sarrail and of the French admiral Louis Dartige du Fournet that the plan provided, in case of resistance, for the bombardment of Athens, bombs dropped from seaplanes on the royal palace, a landing and the arrest of, among others, the royal family.

The atmosphere in Athens was tense. On 12 June, after a military review attended by the king, a crowd marched to the house of Eleftherios Venizelos and then stoned the offices of Venizelist newspapers. The police looked on, and the British minister suspected that its secret agents had been inciting the crowd. Afterwards the British legation was booed.

Four demands

The note was delivered on the afternoon of 21 June. According to Crawfurd Price, the British correspondent in Athens, the British and French ministers came to the Greek Foreign Ministry and, in the absence of the prime minister, handed the document to the ministry’s director-general, Nikolaos Politis. The powers declared that they were not asking Greece to abandon its neutrality, and the very demand for demobilisation was to be the proof of it. They accused the government, however, of favouring foreigners who were misleading Greek public opinion and setting up organisations hostile to the Allies on Greek soil. This meant above all Baron Schenck, head of German propaganda in Greece, who according to the British official history spent large sums on bribing the press. The note also listed the entry of the Bulgarians and the occupation of Rupel “with the consent of the cabinet”, violations of the constitution, the dissolution of parliament twice in less than a year against the will of the electorate, elections held during mobilisation, when many voters were in the army, and police oppression of the government’s opponents.

There were four demands. The army was to be completely demobilised and brought back to a peace footing as quickly as possible. The government was to give way immediately to a cabinet “without political colour”, which would guarantee loyal, benevolent neutrality towards the Allies and fair elections. The Chamber of Deputies was to be dissolved and new elections held after demobilisation. Finally, in agreement with the powers, police officials were to be removed who, under the influence of foreign organisations, had facilitated the persecution of peaceful citizens and insults to the legations. The powers, “always animated by the most benevolent and friendly feelings towards Greece”, laid on the Greek government the entire responsibility for what would happen if their demands were not accepted at once.

Athens gives in

The answer came quickly. Prime Minister Stefanos Skouloudis resigned at once. According to Venizelist sources the general staff advised the king to resist, but Constantine I, staying at his summer residence of Tatoi near Athens, decided that he had no choice and summoned to Athens Alexandros Zaimis, a politician regarded as friendly to the Entente, to form a new government. The American minister in Athens, Garrett Droppers, telegraphed at noon on 22 June that the demands had been accepted and that Zaimis would probably give a favourable reply. According to Price, Zaimis delivered the formal reply, in which the new prime minister agreed to carry out the demands “in their entirety”, on 23 June. On 22 June in London Grey refused to give the House of Commons any explanation, citing the ongoing consultations with the Allies about events the newspapers were already reporting.

The British official history notes that the French had not even informed the British War Office of the preparations for the demonstration, and General George Milne, commander of the British Salonika Army, learned of them unofficially. Abbott wrote that the compliance of Athens disappointed Sarrail and Guillemin, who had hoped for a showdown with the king. The crisis passed, but it did not settle the dispute. Greece began to demobilise, but the discharged reservists soon formed leagues loyal to the king, and the promised elections, postponed with the powers’ consent, did not take place in 1916. From then on the powers acted in Greece no longer as guests but as its self-appointed guardians, which deepened the National Schism.