Last meeting of the War Council

On 14 May 1915 the British War Council met in London. This cabinet committee had since November 1914 taken the most important strategic decisions, including those on the attack on the Dardanelles. Its members had not met since 19 March, the day after the fleet’s failed attempt to force the straits. In those eight weeks the war at the Dardanelles had changed its character, yet no one had discussed this in the council. The meeting of 14 May turned out to be its last.

Deadlock

The situation was grim. The troops of General Ian Hamilton, landed on the Gallipoli peninsula on 25 April, were stuck. At Cape Helles the Second Battle of Krithia had ended with a few hundred metres of ground gained, and the Australians and New Zealanders were pinned in a cramped bridgehead at Anzac Cove. On 10 May Hamilton reported that with two additional divisions he could push forward with good prospects of success. The Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, thought this too little. Meanwhile the Admiralty forbade Admiral de Robeck to make another attempt to force the straits with ships alone until the army had taken the heights above the Narrows.

On 12 May the Admiralty also sent an order recalling home the strongest ship of the expedition, the super-dreadnought Queen Elizabeth. During the night of 12–13 May a Turkish destroyer sank the battleship Goliath at the entrance to the straits, and German U-boats were on their way to the Mediterranean. On the Western Front the attack at Aubers had ended on 9 May in a bloody defeat, and on the morning of 14 May The Times wrote that the British had run short of high-explosive shells. From Russia, which was retreating in Galicia after its defeat at Gorlice, came on 12 May a request from the Russian headquarters for a quick decision at the Dardanelles.

A “sulphurous” meeting

That is what Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, called the meeting years later. According to his account Kitchener began with a solemn complaint. He had agreed to the army’s participation in the operation because the navy had assured him it would force its way through the straits. Now the fleet was pulling back, and the Queen Elizabeth, on whose guns he had based his calculations, was to sail away just when the army was fighting for its life with the sea at its back. At this point the First Sea Lord, Admiral John Fisher, interjected that he had been against the Dardanelles operation from the beginning and that the Prime Minister and Lord Kitchener knew this well. The remark was received in silence.

Kitchener went on painting a dark picture. The army in France was using up shells at a rate no one had foreseen, and ammunition orders were running late. A weakening Russia might allow the Germans to move troops to the west. On top of this there was the threat of a German invasion of the British Isles, so for the time being Kitchener did not want to send new divisions either to France or to Gallipoli. Churchill replied that the operation had never depended on a single ship, and that the Queen Elizabeth would be replaced by monitors, shallow-draught ships with heavy guns, less vulnerable to torpedoes. He argued that an invasion was unlikely, and advised halting the costly attacks in France until there were enough men and ammunition, and sending reinforcements to the Dardanelles.

No decision

According to the British official history the council considered three options: to withdraw from Gallipoli, to send strong reinforcements and seek a quick victory, or to maintain the force, send one more division and slowly bleed the Turks. An immediate withdrawal was judged unacceptable, because admitting defeat could push the Balkan states into the arms of Germany and cause unrest in the Muslim world. No decision, however, was taken. It was resolved only to ask Hamilton how many troops he would need, on the assumption that he would get as many as he asked for. Hamilton replied three days later that, if the political situation in the Balkans did not change, he would need four additional divisions in all.

The reply, however, reached London at a moment when there was no longer anyone to deliberate on it. On the evening of 14 May Churchill prepared notes for Fisher on reinforcing the squadron at the Dardanelles, and on the morning of 15 May Fisher walked out of the Admiralty. A political crisis broke out which within a few days put an end to the purely Liberal government. The War Council never met again. Its place was taken by the Dardanelles Committee of the new coalition government, which met for the first time only at the beginning of June, about three weeks later. In the meantime the question of reinforcements for Gallipoli had to wait.