War Council decides to attack the Dardanelles

On 13 January 1915 the British War Council, the cabinet committee directing the conduct of the war, decided that the Admiralty would prepare a naval expedition against the Dardanelles for February. The decision came less than two weeks after Grand Duke Nicholas asked the British to strike at Turkey to relieve the Russians in the Caucasus. In that time a loose idea of a “demonstration” had grown into a concrete plan to force the strait with ships alone.

Carden’s plan

The plan was drawn up by Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden, commander of the British squadron at the entrance to the Dardanelles. In a telegram of 11 January he set out the operation in four stages: destruction of the forts at the entrance to the strait, clearing the defences along its shores, destruction of the forts at its narrowest point, the Narrows, and finally clearing the minefields and entering the Sea of Marmara. For this he needed twelve battleships, three battlecruisers, three light cruisers, sixteen destroyers, six submarines and twelve minesweepers. In his view the whole thing might take about a month, although much depended on the weather and the morale of the defenders. He also warned that the expenditure of ammunition would be enormous.

The First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, received the plan with enthusiasm. Most of the battleships needed were old pre-dreadnoughts that were not essential for the fight against the German fleet in the North Sea. The squadron was to be joined by the newest British dreadnought, HMS Queen Elizabeth, armed with 15-inch (381 mm) guns. She could bombard the Turkish forts from a range at which they could not reply, and at the same time carry out her gunnery trials. The idea of sending her to the Dardanelles is attributed to the First Sea Lord, Admiral John Fisher.

The meeting of 13 January

The War Council met under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith. Much of the long meeting was devoted to the Western Front. Field Marshal John French, who had come over from France, pressed for reinforcements and ammunition for a planned offensive in Flanders. Only then did Churchill present Carden’s plan. The Council’s secretary, Maurice Hankey, recalled years later that the idea “caught on at once”, and that the members of the Council turned with relief from the dreary prospect of a slogging “exchange of blows” in France to the brighter, as it seemed, prospects in the Mediterranean.

The Secretary of State for War, Lord Herbert Kitchener, considered it worth trying, all the more so because in case of failure the bombardment could simply be broken off. The plan was also supported by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George. No one objected. The admirals present at the meeting, Fisher and the former First Sea Lord Arthur Wilson, also remained silent. Fisher later explained to the commission investigating the expedition that the experts were to speak only when asked.

An unclear resolution

The conclusion of the meeting, written down by Asquith, read: the Admiralty should also prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective.

The wording was unclear, to say the least. Ships could bombard forts, but they could not take a peninsula, let alone the Ottoman capital. That required land forces, and Kitchener did not intend to allot any for the time being. Nor did the resolution say what would happen next if the fleet entered the Sea of Marmara. It was assumed that the appearance of British battleships off Constantinople would cause a coup in Turkey or force it out of the war. The Council in any case left itself a way out. Preparations were to continue, but the final decision to launch the operation was taken only at the end of January.

Fisher’s doubts

Fisher was never convinced by an operation carried out by ships alone. He had earlier argued for a great combined operation of army and navy, and wanted to see tens of thousands of soldiers at the Dardanelles. He also feared that the expedition would draw ships and ammunition away from the North Sea, where the outcome of the war at sea would be decided. In the following days he voiced these fears ever more clearly. In a letter to Admiral John Jellicoe he wrote that he “abominated” the Dardanelles operation unless it was thoroughly changed. At the end of January he threatened to resign, but was persuaded to stay in post.

The attack on the forts at the entrance to the strait began on 19 February 1915. When on 18 March the attempt to force the Narrows ended with several battleships sunk on mines, the British decided to land troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula. This led to what the members of the War Council had wanted to avoid in January: a long and bloody land campaign. Fisher resigned in May 1915, and soon afterwards Churchill lost his post at the Admiralty.