Anglo-French conference in Paris

On 17 November 1915 members of the British War Committee and of the French government met in Paris. From London came Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith, Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, First Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Balfour and Minister of Munitions David Lloyd George. The host was Aristide Briand, who less than three weeks earlier had become head of the government and at the same time taken over the foreign ministry. The fifth member of the British committee, the Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener, was at that time in the eastern Mediterranean and on the same day was visiting Salonika. It was only Asquith’s second meeting with the French government during the war. The first had taken place in July at Calais.

Why the conference was called

According to the British official history of the naval war, the conference was called on the initiative of the French commander-in-chief, General Joseph Joffre. It was to examine the whole tangled situation in the Near East and in general to coordinate the efforts of the two allies better. There were several matters to settle. Serbia was collapsing, and the British and French troops who had advanced from Greece into the Vardar valley had failed to make contact with it. The British government was awaiting Kitchener’s report on the evacuation of Gallipoli. The attitude of Greece was also increasingly worrying. The new prime minister, Stefanos Skouloudis, had announced on 10 November that if the Allied troops withdrew from Serbia onto Greek territory, Greece would have to disarm them. In response the British held up at Malta and in Egyptian ports ships carrying supplies for Greece and suspended export licences. The two governments were preparing a note to Athens, backed by a demonstration by the combined fleet.

Kitchener’s own plan was also on the table. After arriving at Lemnos he had proposed a landing in Ayas Bay, on the Gulf of Alexandretta, to cut the main railway line linking Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia. The idea had earlier been put forward by the commander in Egypt, General John Maxwell, and on the spot it was supported by General Charles Monro and Admiral John de Robeck. For the landing Kitchener wanted to use two divisions intended for Salonika. The British General Staff opposed this, the Admiralty did not want to supply yet another front before Gallipoli or Salonika had been wound up, and the French raised political objections: the bay lay right next to Syria, which they regarded as their sphere of influence. On 15 November the War Committee provisionally concluded that the plan had to be abandoned, and postponed the final decision until the talks in Paris.

Decisions

The British official history of the naval war summarises the conclusions of the conference as follows. No new line of operations was to be opened in the Near East. The two British divisions that were to reinforce the troops in the Mediterranean, and on which Kitchener had been counting for the landing in Ayas Bay, were to sail straight to Salonika. The decision on the evacuation of Gallipoli was to wait for the final assessment of Kitchener and of Colonel Girodon, whom the French had sent there for that purpose. The note to Greece was to be delivered only when Salonika was secured against surprise by the Greek army, the retreat of the British and French troops assured and the naval forces ready to enforce it. According to the British official history of the operations in Macedonia, Kitchener learned of the rejection of his plan on 17 November, at Salonika. The landing in Ayas Bay never took place.

The most far-reaching decision was the creation of an inter-Allied war council with a permanent staff, maintaining close contact with the army and naval staffs of both countries. In the first stage it was to consist of the prime ministers of Britain and France together with experts of their choosing. The council was to advise the governments, and Italy and Russia were also to be invited to take part. Preliminary drafts for closer Allied cooperation had earlier been prepared by Lord Esher and by the secretary of the War Committee, Maurice Hankey. On taking office Briand had promised parliament “unity of front”, including in relations with the allies. The American monthly Current History wrote that it had been announced that day that France and Britain would conduct the war through a joint war council.

It went no further than announcements, however. A permanent council with a joint secretariat was not created, and the historian Elizabeth Greenhalgh points out that Briand did not agree to the permanent secretariat proposed by the British. At the beginning of December the commanders of the Allied armies met at Chantilly, and the first formal political conference of the Allies did not meet in Paris until the end of March 1916. The joint Supreme War Council was not created until November 1917.