Battle of the Narew and Biebrza

The Battle of the Narew and Biebrza was the northern arm of the great offensive that the Central Powers launched on the Eastern Front in July 1915. The German army group of General Max von Gallwitz struck south from the border of East Prussia towards the Narew, while on its left flank the weaker Eighth Army advanced. Within two weeks the Germans broke through the strongly fortified Russian positions at Przasnysz, reached the Narew and crossed it at Różan and Pułtusk. They were to go on towards the Bug, into the rear of the Russian armies defending Warsaw. The Russians, however, fell back step by step and counter-attacked, and their main forces managed to slip out of the threatened salient.

Name and dates

On this page we use the dates 13–26 July 1915 and the name from the British chronology of the war, which speaks of the Battle of the Narew and Bobr. Bobr is the Russian name of the Biebrza, a right-bank tributary of the Narew. On 13 July the Germans attacked at Przasnysz, and on 26 July they repulsed a great Russian counter-attack on the bridgeheads beyond the Narew.

Other works divide this fighting differently. Russian historiography distinguishes the Second Przasnysz Operation, from 13 to 18 July, and the Narew Operation, from 23 July to 2 August. Russian documents also give dates in the Julian calendar, 13 days earlier. The Germans spoke of the breakthrough battle of Przasnysz, and in German literature the whole operation is called the Narew offensive. The 1922 Encyclopaedia Britannica describes in turn the Battle of Przasnysz (13–14 July), the fighting for the Bogate position (15–17 July), the march to the Narew, the storming of Pułtusk (23–25 July) and of Różan (22–25 July), and, from 26 July to 3 August, a separate battle on the Orz, that is at Goworowo. The fighting on the Narew therefore did not end on 26 July. It continued until the beginning of August, and the German offensive in this direction until the second half of August.

Background

After the breakthrough at Gorlice and the recapture of Lviv, the armies of Field Marshal August von Mackensen turned north, between the Vistula and the Bug, towards Lublin and Chełm. The Russian front in the Kingdom of Poland formed a great salient projecting westwards. On 2 July, at a conference in Posen, the Chief of the German General Staff, General Erich von Falkenhayn, pushed through, against Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff, a thrust across the Narew to the south, to meet Mackensen. Hindenburg and Ludendorff preferred a wide envelopment through Kovno and Vilna, and said of Falkenhayn’s plan that the fortifications at Przasnysz and on the Narew could not be crossed quickly enough to cut off the Russians.

The front in northern Masovia had stood still since the spring. After the fighting of February and March, described on the page on the First Battle of Przasnysz, the Russians held a line from the approaches to Łomża through the area of Jednorożec on the Orzyc and the approaches to Przasnysz to Grudusk, from where it turned south-west towards the Vistula. Behind it they prepared a second position, between Ciechanów and Krasnosielc, and further back bridgeheads on the Narew itself: at Różan, Pułtusk and Łomża, as well as the fortifications of Zegrze and Serock. At the confluence of the Narew and the Vistula stood the fortress of Novogeorgievsk, today’s Modlin, and on the eastern flank, on the Biebrza, the fortress of Osowiec, which in the winter had repulsed German attacks during the Winter Battle in Masuria.

After their defeats in Galicia the Russian armies were exhausted and short of ammunition. At the beginning of July the high command decided not to fight a decisive battle in the Kingdom of Poland, but to fall back gradually, gaining time. The defence of the Narew was to cover this retreat.

Forces

Gallwitz’s army group, renamed the Twelfth Army only in August, comprised five corps and more than a dozen divisions. Some of them had been sent from the Ninth Army near Warsaw, and during the battle Hindenburg sent further ones. According to the Soviet history of the war published in 1975, the group had about 177,000 men and more than 1,200 guns. The German Eighth Army of General Friedrich von Scholtz, standing east of the Szkwa, from the area of Kolno to Osowiec, was weak and made up largely of Landwehr.

On the Russian side the main burden fell on the First Army of General Alexander Litvinov, with the I Turkestan Corps, the I Siberian Corps, the XXVII Corps and the I Cavalry Corps. According to the same Soviet history it had about 107,000 men and just under 400 guns. To its east, from the area of Ostrołęka to Osowiec, the Twelfth Army of General Aleksei Churin was on the defensive. Both were commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Front, General Mikhail Alekseyev, who during the battle brought reinforcements to the Narew from the Second and Fourth Armies, from the garrison of Novogeorgievsk and from Courland.

Course

The breakthrough at Przasnysz (13–14 July). At dawn on 13 July the German artillery opened fire on the Russian positions on a sector about 30 kilometres wide, between the Orzyc river and Grudusk. The bombardment lasted from three to six hours, and according to Russian accounts the defenders lost up to a third of their men in it. Before noon the XI, XVII and XIII Corps went in to the assault. By evening they had taken the first line of Russian positions on both sides of Przasnysz, without attacking the town itself. During the night the Russian First Army withdrew to a switch position between Przasnysz and Ciechanów, and on 14 July it gave up Przasnysz without a fight.

The Bogate position (15–17 July). The Germans now had to break through the second line of Russian fortifications, prepared between Ciechanów and Krasnosielc. On the afternoon of 15 July, after a short bombardment, several German divisions broke through it near Zielona, and during the night the Russians abandoned Ciechanów. On 16 July the fighting moved east, where at Podoś on the Orzyc the village changed hands several times. On 17 July the Russians, reinforced by the first reinforcements, put up stubborn resistance on the next line, but in the evening the German divisions reached Maków. According to a German communiqué of 17 July, Gallwitz’s group had so far taken 17,500 prisoners and the Eighth Army 2,500.

On the Narew (18–21 July). During the night of 17–18 July the Russians withdrew into the bridgeheads at Pułtusk and Różan and behind the river itself, and a day later they left their last positions in front of Ostrołęka. The Eighth Army, advancing from Kolno, pushed its opponents back behind the Narew and into Łomża. The summer was dry and the Narew could be forded in many places, but without taking Pułtusk or Różan a crossing gave the Germans little. Gallwitz brought up heavy artillery, including guns of the heaviest calibres. On 20 July the Russians unexpectedly counter-attacked between Różan and Pułtusk and crossed to the right bank. The Germans drove them back, but had to postpone the assault on the bridgeheads by two or three days.

Różan and Pułtusk (22–24 July). At Różan the German XIII Corps took successive sections of the bridgehead’s outer line: on 22 July the 4th Guards Division stormed the village of Miłony, and on 23 July the 3rd Division took further fortifications. On the morning of 23 July, after five hours of bombardment, the group of General Otto von Plüskow attacked the Pułtusk bridgehead and by evening had pushed the defenders back to the inner line, while the 1st Guards Reserve Division crossed the Narew above the town. Litvinov ordered a retreat behind the river. During the night of 23–24 July the Russians abandoned both bridgeheads, burning the bridges, and in the morning the Germans entered Różan and Pułtusk. The forts of Różan were not taken in battle. That same night the German 2nd Division forded the Narew at Kamionka, between Różan and Ostrołęka.

Bridgeheads beyond the Narew (24–26 July). On 24 July Alekseyev issued a directive for a general retreat from around Warsaw to the line Łomża–Ostrów–Węgrów–Siedlce. The First Army, however, was to hold the Germans on the Narew as long as possible. On 25 July the Germans widened their bridgeheads south of Pułtusk and east of Różan, and the Eighth Army crossed the river near the mouth of the Szkwa. On 26 July Litvinov threw all his forces into the attack, according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica 16–18 divisions, supported by artillery firing from carefully hoarded stocks. The greatest danger was in the woods east of Różan, where the Russians pushed the Germans back almost to the bridges. By evening the German bridgeheads had held along the whole front.

Losses

Complete figures do not exist. According to Russian estimates the First Army alone lost about 40,000 men in the fighting at Przasnysz in mid-July, while German losses in this phase are estimated very differently: from 10,000 according to the German Reichsarchiv to 40,000 according to some Russian authors. On the Narew some Russian regiments lost as much as two thirds of their strength, and the German divisions, especially the reserve and Landwehr divisions, also suffered heavy losses. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, from 13 July to 3 August Gallwitz’s group took about 50,000 prisoners, but only 14 guns and about 150 machine guns.

Northern Masovia also suffered badly. Przasnysz, already destroyed in February, was again under fire, and the retreating Russians burned bridges and some of the buildings of the towns along the Narew.

Significance

The battle brought the Germans a clear tactical success. In two weeks they broke through positions that the Russians had been fortifying since the spring and forced the Narew, and in August their troops entered Ostrołęka, Warsaw and Łomża. They did not achieve their strategic aim. Progress was slow: according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, ten days passed between Przasnysz and the assault on the bridgeheads on the Narew. The Russians, fighting for every line and counter-attacking, gained time to evacuate Warsaw and withdraw their armies from beyond the Vistula. On the Narew the fears of Hindenburg and Ludendorff proved justified: the frontal attack pushed the Russians out of the Kingdom of Poland, but did not trap them in an encirclement.