End of the Battle of Cambrai

On 3 December 1917 the last day of heavy fighting took place at Cambrai. The Germans, who had gone over to the counter-attack on 30 November, took the village of La Vacquerie and drove the British out of the canal bend at Marcoing. The same day Field Marshal Douglas Haig decided that the projecting salient with Bourlon Wood, taken in November at the cost of heavy losses, had to be given up. The British Battles Nomenclature Committee adopted 3 December as the last day of the German counter-attacks, and the British chronology of the war as the day the whole Battle of Cambrai ended. The withdrawal itself to the new line went on until 7 December.

The last attacks

After several days of bitter fighting both sides were exhausted. The Germans had no fresh divisions left and were not planning another great blow, but on 3 December Group “Caudry” attacked once more on two narrow sectors. In the morning, after heavy shelling, German infantry advanced in waves on La Vacquerie, while parties of bombers worked their way along the trenches. British fire inflicted heavy losses on the attackers in the open, but the Gloucestershire Regiment battalions of the 61st Division had to abandon the village. Only a strongpoint on its north-western edge remained in British hands, and on the slopes of Welsh Ridge fighting went on all day.

At about 10.30 a.m. the Germans also attacked in the bend of the St Quentin Canal beyond Marcoing, where the 16th Brigade of the 6th Division stood. The first two attacks were beaten off by the 14th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry. The wounded Captain Arthur Lascelles twice led a counter-attack and retook a lost trench, and when he was captured in the confusion of the third attack, he escaped and rallied his men again. For this he was awarded the Victoria Cross. In the afternoon both battalions, being outflanked on both sides, fought their way back across the canal. According to the British official history, the Durham battalion lost 14 officers and 262 other ranks that day out of about 450 men in the line. The Germans did not follow them into Marcoing. During the night the commander of the 6th Division withdrew all units behind the canal, and at dawn on 4 December the sappers blew up the bridges.

Haig’s decision

Haig had already considered the idea of a withdrawal on 2 December with his chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Launcelot Kiggell. The Marcoing–Bourlon salient, cutting deep into the German lines, required many troops to defend and was exposed to fire from three sides. The commander of the Third Army, General Julian Byng, was instructed to select a suitable winter line, but without issuing orders. On the morning of 3 December Haig visited Byng at Albert. Byng judged that to hold the salient permanently he would need two additional divisions. He also pointed to a defensive line in the rear, largely coinciding with the old German support line of the Hindenburg Line, with the fortifications of the village of Flesquières. Haig then decided that the withdrawal should take place as soon as possible.

In the evening he explained his decision in a telegram to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General William Robertson. He wrote that the present line could be held, but that it would absorb troops which, with no reinforcements coming, he could not spare for the purpose. His reserves in case of a serious attack were very small, the men needed rest after fighting that had gone on since April, and some divisions had already left for Italy. Haig had even had to ask General Philippe Pétain to keep French reinforcements ready behind his right flank. He added that in this situation he saw no possibility of taking over a further sector of the front from the French or of sending more divisions to Italy. As the British official history stresses, Haig was already thinking of the spring of 1918: he expected a great German offensive and did not want to hold any particularly vulnerable point.

Withdrawal to Flesquières Ridge

The Third Army order was issued at 9.30 a.m. on 4 December. The British were giving up Marcoing, Noyelles, Cantaing, Bourlon Wood and ridge, Anneux and Graincourt. For the sake of secrecy most units learnt the day and hour of the withdrawal only on the afternoon of 4 December, and the operation was not to be mentioned by telephone or telegraph. On the night of 4/5 December the infantry fell back to an intermediate position, and the rearguards left at dawn, carrying away or destroying ammunition and stores. The canal bridge on the Bapaume road went up at 6.21 a.m. For most of 5 December the Germans shelled empty trenches, and only at about 3 p.m., probably thanks to air reconnaissance, did they realise that their opponent had gone. According to the British official history the withdrawal came as a complete surprise to them. Over the following days the British also left the intermediate position, and on the morning of 7 December the Third Army was already standing on its winter line.

Outcome

In terms of ground the battle achieved little. On a sector about eight kilometres long, from Marcoing to Demicourt, the British had advanced roughly three kilometres, less than they had taken on the morning of 20 November. In the south the Germans had penetrated to a similar depth into the former British positions on a front about six kilometres wide, between Épehy and the Péronne–Cambrai road. The losses of both sides were similar, some forty-odd thousand men each. A German account calculated that since 30 November it had taken 75 British officers and 2,556 other ranks, and 85 guns. On the German side, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria had accepted as early as 2 December that the plan to encircle the British had failed, and the Supreme Army Command judged that further attacks had no chance.

In London the bells that had rung at the news of the victory of 20 November quickly faded from memory, and questions took their place. The War Cabinet demanded an explanation from Haig of how the surprise of 30 November had come about. On 18 December Haig sent a telegraphed summary based on Byng’s report, which claimed that there had been no surprise and that the blame lay with the poor training of junior officers, NCOs and men. In his written report of 24 December, however, Haig took ultimate responsibility on himself: it was he who had decided after the first two days to press on towards Bourlon, which had exhausted the troops. The government also sought the opinion of General Jan Smuts, and in January 1918 a court of inquiry under General Alexander Hamilton-Gordon sat at Hesdin. The failure at Cambrai, after the bloody months in Flanders, weakened the position of Haig and his staff in relation to the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George.